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Civil Rights Litigation After Monell
Eric Schnapper*
In the years between 1961 and 1978, when federal civil fights litiga-
tion emerged as a significant portion of the work of the federal courts '
and a major vehicle for developing and enforcing constitutional law, the
course and outcome of that litigation was colored by the Supreme Court's
decision in Monroe v. Pape 2 that cities could not be sued for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations. 3  That decision ultimately
came to govern not only the availability of monetary relief, but also the
availability of injunctive relief against a governmental body,4 the applic-
ability of state law remedial principles under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 5 the joinder
of state law claims against such bodies,6 and the scope of injunctive relief
available against state and local officials.7  The practical importance of
* Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in Law, Columbia
University. B.A. 1962, M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B. PhiL. 1965, Oxford University;
LL.B. 1968, Yale University. Mr. Schuapper was an attorney for the petitioners in Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
1. In the first 175 years of constitutional litigation most constitutional issues involving
state or local governments originated in the state courts and only reached the federal courts
by appeal to, or writ of error or certiorari from, the Supreme Court. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
3. This aspect of Monroe was widely criticized as grounded on an inaccurate reading of
the legislative history of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Kates & Kouba, Liability of
Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 131, 132-36
(1972); Comment, Toward State and Municipal Liability in Damages for Denial of Racial
Equal Protection. 57 CALF. L. lRv. 1142, 1164-69 (1969); Note, Developing Governmental
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. Rnv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971).
More recently jurisdiction over constitutional claims has been alleged under statutes which
do not contain the limitation found by Monroe in § 1983. In light of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678 (1946), inferring a right of action directly under the Constitution, jurisdiction has been
asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Seven circuits have upheld monetary and injunctive
claims against cities and counties on this basis. See Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622,
624 (6th Cir. 1978) (citing cases). The Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue. See Mount
Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). Similar actions against government
bodies for violations of the specific prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1976) have been
upheld. Jurisdiction over these cases is conferred upon federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976). See, e.g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as
moot, 99 S. Ct. 1379 (1979).
4. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973).
5. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 706-10 (1973).
6. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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other decisions, such as those providing absolute immunity for judges,8
prosecutors,9 and legislators, 10 and qualified immunity for executive offi-
cials," turned on Monroe as well. Thus, the foundation of many of these
procedural and remedial rules was destroyed in June 1978 when the Supreme
Court overruled Monroe in Mdnell v. Department of Social Services,12 and
held that cities and counties could be sued under section 1983 for constitu-
tional violations rooted in official policies.
Monroe and its progeny had created a situation that was historically
and constitutionally anomalous. First, Monroe stood on its head one of
the most basic remedial principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence. If
the Constitution was violated by a city, damage awards, long the traditional
remedy for violation of a legal duty, were denied against the city, but a pro-
spective injunction, usually the exceptional remedy, could be obtained, albeit
nominally against the individual officials. Second, the scope of possible
remedies was inversely proportional to the importance of the substantive
legal principles involved; damages, essential to redressing past violations
and deterring new ones, were generally available under state law for a
simple tort by city employees, but not for a systematic violation of "the
supreme law of the land." A city or state was free to violate the Constitu-
tion with impunity, confident that if and when the violation was detected,
its officials would merely be directed to refrain from such violations in the
future. As a result, state and local authorities who faced a possible conflict
between constitutional values and more mundane interests had every reason
to cavalierly disregard the former. Third, even though the fourteenth
amendment was directed primarily at the conduct of states and cities as
such, and only incidentally touches the actions of wayward public employees
or private individuals acting in concert with them, it was solely against such
employees and individuals, if at all, that damages could be obtained. Monell
concluded that none of this was required by the language of section 1983 or
by its legislative history.
Monell may end the controversy over the validity of Monroe, but the
extent to which monetary relief will be available against governmental bodies
remains unclear. A series of Supreme Court and lower court decisions were
required to flesh out the meaning of Monroe until the Supreme Court decided
to abandon it. Monell raises an entirely new, and more complex, set of
issues and calls into question the vitality of past decisions which were based
on Monroe. The answers ultimately arrived at will determine whether the
victims of constitutional violations are to have a meaningful new remedy, or
whether Monell is to be drained of meaning by exceptions and qualifications.
This Article identifies the most important issues which must be dealt
8. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
9. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
10. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
11. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974).
12. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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with after Moneil and attempts to resolve them. Section I considers what
rules and practices are "official acts, policies and customs" subjecting a
government to suit under Moneil. The second section analyzes the possible
defenses available to a city; it concludes that the good faith immunity afforded
to executive officials should not be extended to government entities, but that
such entities should be afforded a somewhat narrower defense. Section III
discusses the scope of injunctive relief available in section 1983 actions
against state officials. Finally, section IV urges that after Monell state law
claims against cities can and should be tried in federal court when joined
with section 1983 actions.
I. OFFICIAL ACTS, POLICIES, AND CUSTOMS
In Monell the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant city agencies had as
a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons, a
practice the Court had earlier declared unconstitutional.' 3 Seven members
of the Court agreed that such a policy was a sufficient basis for municipal
liability.1J4 Although this was dispositive of the case, the Court went further
and stated that, as to other cases, some form of "official" policy or action
would be required, and that liability could not be based solely on the prin-
ciples of respondeat superior.15 The standard for deciding what is such an
official policy or action will be critical to the scope and vitality of Monell.
This aspect of the Court's decision, which Justice Stevens properly
characterized as "merely advisory," 16 dealt with an issue which was not in
13. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
14. Subject to possible defenses. See text accompanying notes 133-216 infra.
15. The distinction between imposing § 1983 liability for official policies and imposing
liability based on respondeat superior was suggested in Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal
Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483 (1977).
The Court's opinion offered four grounds for rejecting the respondeat superior rule, but
its reasoning is not persuasive. First, it suggested that the fact that § 1983 makes a city liable
if it caused a violation of the Constitution implies there was to be no liability in the absence
of such causation. 436 U.S. at 692. But a city takes an action that is an essential causal link
in the origin of the violation merely by hiring the errant employee. The issue is why the city
act causing the violation must be an official policy; no support for that limitation appears on
the face of § 1983. Second, the Court asserted that respondeat superior would have raised the
same constitutional objections as the rejected Sherman Amendment, which would have imposed
liability on counties and cities for damages caused by certain types of riots. The key constitu-
tional objection, according to Monell itself, was that some counties lacked authority under
state law to police and control the civilian population, and that Congress could not impose
such a duty. Id. at 693. But all counties certainly had the authority and duty under state law
to control the conduct of their own employees. Third, the Court suggests that the policy
reasons for respondeat superior-deterrence and mutual insurance-were "of the same sort"
that were offered for the Sherman Amendment. Id. at 694. But as the Court itself notes,
Congress did not disapprove the Amendment because opponents rejected these arguments, but
because the Amendment would have created liability for private conduct over which counties
had no control. Id. at 679-80. Fourth, the Court emphasized that the Amendment was criticized
for imposing liability even where a city or county did not know of an impending riot or had
done everything in its power to prevent it. Id. at 692-93 n.57. But a city only "knows" and
"does" things through its employees, and nothing in the debates on the Sherman Amendment
suggests any opponent thought it relevant which city employee knew of or failed to stop a
riot, providing some city employee did.
16. 436 U.S. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
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controversy in Monell itself, which neither party had raised or briefed,
and which the courts below had not addressed. The absence of such a
controversy will frequently mean that there is no record to which the advisory
decision can be applied, and the absence of such a concrete application to
particular facts will often obscure the meaning of the decision itself. Monell
is such a case. It is apparent from the opinion that a city will not be held
liable merely because a city employee committed a constitutional tort in the
course of his or her employment, but is not clear what more is required.
The opinion recites "this case unquestionably involves official policy,"'17
but this statement seems to be no more than an assertion that the city had
abandoned the issue in 1971 when it filed an Answer which failed to deny
the existence of the alleged policy.18 If the Court thought that the actual
facts of Monell constituted "official policy," the opinion does not disclose
what it believed those facts to be.
Monell does contain a number of vague and somewhat different descrip-
tions of what the Court requires in order to hold a municipality liable
under section 1983, which it may have thought present:
(1) "[A] policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." 10
(2) An action or policy that has "received formal approval
through the body's official decision making channels." 20
(3) An action or policy "made by its law makers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy."2
1
Manifestly, no clear or established meaning can be attached to any of
these phrases; the Court does not indicate which employees are "officers,"
how to identify a "decision making channel," or how to assess the "fairness"
of attributing a policy to the city.
The discussion which follows seeks to delineate the types of actions
which should subject a city to liability under Monell. It considers, first,
which city employees should be regarded as "policymakers" in various
circumstances. It then discusses the role of "custom" in section 1983 litiga-
tion as a separate basis for liability. This is followed by an analysis of
17. Id. at 694 (Brennan, J.).
18. Id. at 661 n.2. It seems unreasonable to attach significance to a pleading filed seven
years before Monell made the existence of a "policy" of legal significance. But cf. Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.20 (1977) (district
court's refusal to allow questioning of decisionmakers about their motives not an abuse of
discretion, even though Supreme Court subsequently held that those motives were pivotal
issue). Where new substantive or procedural rules are adopted, civil litigants should ordinarily
be afforded an opportunity to supplement records made or modify pleadings filed prior to
that development.
19. 436 U.S. at 690.
20. Id. at 691. The quoted language appears in the Court's discussion of governmental
"customs" which have not been formally approved. The implication is clear that formally
approved policies are sufficient to subject a municipality to liability.
21. Id. at 694.
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whether a city's liability should be affected if it adopts rules forbidding
unconstitutional conduct. Finally, the question of the scope of a city's
liability for "causing" a person to be subjected to a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights will be addressed. It will become clear from this discussion
that municipalities will face liability under section 1983 in a wide variety of
situations.22
A. Identifying the Proper Decisionmakers
Application of this aspect of Monell must begin with the recognition
that a city, county, or other governmental unit does not physically pass
legislation, hire police, or teach schools. Those activities are all undertaken
by natural persons, and governmental decisions and policies are in the first
instance decisions and policies by individual government employees as to
what they or other government employees will do. The problem is thus
to decide which actions by which government employees are to be
characterized under Monell as the actions of "the government." Resolving
that issue would be a simple matter if the government charter, constitution,
or other comparable document conferred all the government's authority
for all purposes on a single individual. Such an individual could properly
claim "L'tat, c'est moi," and anything he or she did would be an official
act or policy. While there may in fact be a few very small towns with only
a single official, in virtually every city, county, and other unit of government
the authority for "taking official action," for deciding which government
employees will do what, is divided among a number of government em-
ployees in a variety of complex ways.
1. Final Authorities. As to any particular decision as to what "the
government" will do, there must be one person, or group of persons, who
in the ordinary course of government business can make the final decision
over what will occur. As to that decision, that individual or group by
definition exercises the authority of the governmental unit, since some
individual or group must do so, and all others are either irrelevant or subordi-
nate. Other individuals or groups may play some role, and under some
circumstances their acts too may be official policy, but when the pro-
gression of possible appeals reaches a level over which no other government
employees exercises line authority, the official at that level necessarily exer-
cises the final authority of the city. Such a final policymaker is, as to the
particular decision involved, in precisely the same position as the sole
official of a one-official town.
The final authority of a governmental unit may be divided in a number
of ways. First, it may be divided into branches-executive, legislative, and
22. This section is concerned only with identifying the governmental actions which would
render a governmental defendant liable if those actions are unconstitutional or if they cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights. The question of possible defenses or immunities for
governmental defendants is considered separately in section II inira.
1979]
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in some cases judicial. The legislature may formulate general policies, the
executive may adopt more specific policies and particular actions, and the
judiciary may serve in part to assure that the policies of the other branches
are consistent with higher law (e.g., that city regulations do not violate city
ordinances or state law), and may adopt policies of its own or elaborate on
policies contained in state statutes or other laws. These final authorities
often interrelate through a series of checks and balances, and there may be
formal or informal interrelations between the final authorities of different
government units, but the action of one authority is, as a practical matter
and in common sense parlance, the action of the entity. Second, the authority
may be divided by subject matter; an autonomous city treasurer may have
final authority over assessing taxes or the board of education over who will
teach and what will be taught, with the mayor unable to overturn their
decisions. These may be separately elected officials, or may be legally inde-
pendent officials or agencies comparable to, for example, the National Labor
Relations Board at the federal level. Third, the division of authority may
be geographic, as occurs in New York City where borough presidents exercise
limited executive functions over particular portions of the city.23
The nature of the division is important in determining when an
individual acts as a final authority. If, for example, a city treasurer deliberate-
ly assesses the homes of blacks at a higher rate because of their race, the city
would properly be held liable for the violation; but if the treasurer were to
assault a black for sitting at a white lunch counter, he or she would act merely
as another city employee, and would not necessarily render the city subject
to suit. The issue is not whether the specific action taken is legally authorized.
In a sense any violation of the Constitution is ipso facto unauthorized.24 But
as long as there is no one in the same branch of government with the legal
power to directly control an official's conduct, he or she is a final authority.
This category of employees, or more properly this category of employee
action (since a final authority for one purpose may not be so for another),
may well be what the Court had in mind in Monell when it referred to a
"body's officers." Inclusion does not depend, however, on whether an
employee is denoted an "officer" under city or state law, or enjoys any
particular trappings of office. The defendants in Monell included two such
final authorities: the mayor, who was alleged to be responsible for the policy
administered by most city agencies, and the city board of education, an
autonomous body which established its own personnel policies.25 Ordinarily,
the determination of whether a particular employee is a final authority can
be made from written statutes and other provisions. Unlike the delegation
problem, discussed below, there is likely to be a fairly clear and readily
23. See N.Y. CrrY CrARTER ch. 4 (1976).
24. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1907).
25. See N.Y. EDuC. LAW §§ 2551, 2554, 2576, 2580, 2590-g (McKinney 1970 & Supp.
1978).
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ascertainable rule as to who has such ultimate power, subject to two
caveats. First, an employee who asserts final authority over a question is
such a final authority so long as he actually succeeds in exercising that
power, even if the exercise ultimately is held improper. Thus in Monell, if
the mayor had directed, over the objection of the school board, that
principals fire pregnant teachers, and that direction had been obeyed,
whether the mayor had acted outside of his proper sphere of final authority
would not have been an issue of concern under section 1983. Second,
formal powers will not always reflect real authority; the mayor may have
nominal power to overrule the city treasurer, but if by tradition, or due to
political constraints, the mayor rarely if ever does so, the treasurer would
properly be regarded as a final authority.
2. Delegated Authorities. Ordinarily, the final or highest authority as
to a particular question will not be the only employee concerned with that
issue. The carrying out of the final authority's responsibilities will involve
subordinate individuals and, at times, subordinate agencies. Occasionally,
those subordinates will have purely ministerial functions. More commonly,
however, there will be delegated to those subordinates one or more of several
types of decisionmaking authority: (a) determining the existence of certain
facts and taking specified action according to the facts; (b) devising and
carrying out a means for achieving a specified goal;26 and (c) defining goals
and devising and carrying out means of achieving them. Decisions (b) and
(c) involve the formulation of policies as to means or ends. If an employee
exercising such delegated authority decides upon a goal or a method of
achieving it which violates the Constitution, that decision is the government
policy. If a city were not liable for the exercise of delegated policymaking
authority, but only for the acts of final authorities, Monell could be nullified
by the simple expedient of delegating responsibility for all constitutionally
suspect decisions to lower level officials.
The legislative history of section 1983 supports this common sense
application of the statute. As is noted in detail below, 27 proponents of the
1871 Civil Rights Act consistently rejected arguments that only the legis-
lature was "the state" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment;
they insisted that the state misconduct forbidden by that amendment included
a~tion by the other branches of state government as well as by subordinate
employees. Senator Edmunds, one of the bill's leading spokesmen, explained:
A State is a corporation; it exists only, in contemplation of law, as
an organized thing; and it is manifested, represented entirely, and
fully in respect to every one of its functions, by that department of
its government on which the execution of those functions is re-
26. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976), described "formulat[ing] plans for imple-
mentation of broad goals" as a policyrnaking function.
27. See text accompanying notes 49-58 infra.
1979]
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spectively devolved. Therefore, if it is the duty of the executive
and judicial departments of a State to enforce a law and they do
not enforce it, the State does not enforce it.2 8
Edmunds explained that whether a state enforced and respected constitu-
tionally protected rights was to be ascertained by examining the actions of
"the functionaries appointed by the state for that purpose." 21 If "there is a
State organism . . . which is intrusted with the local administration of
justice," then whether the state has met its constitutional obligations must
be measured by the conduct of that entity. 30
The policy involved in Monell itself was adopted by a lower city official
exercising delegated authority. City regulations did not require in all cases
that a pregnant employee go on leave after her fifth month of pregnancy,
but merely directed that if the employee wished to work after the fifth month
she had to secure "agency medical approval to work and the approval of the
agency head." 3' Within the Department of Social Services the Com-
missioner's discretion on such matters had been generally delegated to an
Assistant Deputy Administrator for Personnel Management. 32 There were
no written standards as to how the Assistant Deputy Administrator exercised
that discretion; in practice he permitted any woman to work in the sixth and
seventh months if physically able, allowed pregnant employees to work in
their eighth month only if their jobs were "unusually important to the
Department," and prohibited any employee from working during her ninth
month.33  After the complaint in Monell was filed, the Deputy Mayor
expressly forbade imposing leaves of absence on women "able to work,"
asserting that agencies following policies to the contrary had "misunder-
stood" the "discretion" afforded to each agency under city regulations. 4
Nonetheless the Supreme Court apparently had no doubt that what the
Assistant Deputy Administrator was doing met the "official policy" require-
ment established by Monell.35
Several other Supreme Court decisions also illustrate this principle. In
28. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 696 (1871).
29. Id. at 697.
30. Id. at 756. Five years after the adoption of § 1983 the Supreme Court noted, "A
corporation can act only by its agents or servants . . . . A municipal corporation may
act through its mayor, through its common council, or its legislative department by whatever
name called, its superintendent of streets, commissioner of highways, or board of public works,
provided the act is within the province committed to its charge." Barnes v. District of
Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 545 (1876) (emphasis added). In Monroe, Justice Frankfurter urged
in dissent that the action of a city official was only "under color of law" if the official had
authority at state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 224-46 (1961). Such authorization was
not limited, in his view, to statutes, but included sanction by any state organ "responsible...
for the formulation and administration of local policy." Id. at 237. This admittedly still-born
doctrine seems analogous to the delegated authority rule suggested here.
31. Defendants Notice of Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
32. See Stipulation of May 16, 1974, at 2.
33. Id.
34. Defendants Notice of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 31, Exhibit A.
35. See 436 U.S. at 694.
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Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District,36 the Court upheld an
action for injunctive and monetary relief against a school board and its
directors because the principals of the Des Moines schools had adopted a
policy of forbidding students to wear armbands to protest the war in
Vietnam. Although there was no indication that the board itself had taken
any action, adopting such a prohibition was presumably within the delegated
policymaking discretion of a principal. 37 Similarly in Bounds v. Smith,38
the Court affirmed an injunction against the North Carolina Department of
Correction, directing the adoption of certain remedial measures because only
one of the state's seventy-seven prisons had a law library and that library
was inadequate. Nothing on the face of the opinion suggested that the De-
partment itself had affirmatively prohibited such libraries; the officials to
whom the Department had delegated responsibility for each prison apparently
had exercised their authority over their individual appropriations and decided
not to buy law books.
In Monell itself the complaint alleged that the Department of Social
Services had a policy of requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves
of absence.3 9 Although there was also an allegation of a "citywide" policy,
presumably including other agencies, nothing in the Court's opinion suggests
that the official policy of a city department, acting within its presumed
authority to regulate its own personnel matters, would not be a sufficient
basis for liability. Indeed Moneil's reference to "the body's official decision-
making channels" 40 suggests that the existence of an official policy should
be determined by an inquiry into the body's rules and practices for delegating
authority to make decisions for the particular governmental unit involved.
Three related distinctions must be kept in mind in applying this principle.
First, the issue under MonelI is whether a particular decision involves the
making of policy, not whether the official who made it might generally be
characterized as a policymaking official. 41 An official who formulates a
single unconstitutional policy is not outside the scope of Monell because he
does not frequently make such decisions; conversely, an official who often
makes fundamental city policies does not necessarily subject the city to suit
when he acts outside that area of delegated policymaking authority. Second,
not all delegated authority is policymaking authority. If the employee is
authorized to exercise discretion to choose ends or means, either from a
36. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker was among the cases cited by Monell as upholding
§ 1983 jurisdiction against school boards despite Monroe. 436 U.S. at 663 nn.5 & 6.
37. Justice Black stated that the order was issued by "the elected school officials and the
teachers vested with state authority to do so." 393 U.S. at 516 (dissenting opinion). The
reference to the elected officials appears to be erroneous.
38. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
39. 436 U.S. at 660-61.
40. Id. at 691.
41. The latter classification determines whether a public employee may be dismissed
because of his political beliefs. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). See generally
Comment, Patronage and the First Amendment After Elrod v. Bums, 78 COLUM. L. REv.
468 (1978).
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specified list or without such limitation, and the employee selects a goal
(e.g., segregation) or a method of achievement (e.g., denial of due process)
that violates the Constitution, then the government faces liability under
Monell. But if there is no such discretion, and the end or means is dictated
by an objective rule based on what the employee believes the facts to be,
then the employee does not have formally delegated policymaking authority.
If the employee makes an error of fact, and a constitutional violation results,
that would not by itself give rise to municipal liability; but if the objective
rule itself mandates a violation under certain circumstances, the application
of that rule would result in liability, though the policy involved would have
been made by the higher official promulgating that rule. Third, "policy-
making" does not require the adoption of a rule of general application;
Monell refers to official "acts" as well as official "policies." The issue is not
the scope of the decision but the scope of the decisionmaker's mandate. If
a mayor decides, in a particular case, to direct that a house be broken into
unlawfully, that is official policy. The same decision is also an official
policy if the authority to make it is delegated to and exercised by a subor-
dinate official.
Determining whether an employee has acted within the scope of the
authority delegated to him or her will ordinarily be more difficult than ascer-
taining the identities of final authorities. The issue is not whether an
employee is required or forbidden to take certain action, but whether the
decision has been delegated to the employee. The scope of delegated authority
will frequently not be in writing, or even be the subject of a clear, well-
understood though unwritten rule. Any listing of responsibilities would
not ordinarily be exclusive, since an exclusive list might inhibit effective
action to deal with unforeseen problems. In addition, the authority for
making city or state policy as to a particular issue may co-exist at several
levels within the government. But while there may be no express rules as to
who may make policies, the primary responsibilities of an employee-what
he or she is supposed to accomplish-will often be relatively clear. So long
as a policy or action is reasonably related to carrying out those responsi-
bilities, and so long as it has not been expressly precluded as a method of
doing SO, 42 that policy or action should ordinarily be regarded as within the
scope of the employee's delegated authority. The likelihood that an
employee will have policymaking authority, and the scope of that authority,
will generally increase with the breadth and importance of his or her
responsibilities. Certainly the type of authority ordinarily exercised by the
same employee, or others similarly situated, is the best guide to the scope
of their actual authority, particularly where it is exercised in an open and
42. The authority delegated to an agent "is, unless the contrary manifestly appears to be
the intent of the party, always construed to include all necessary and usual means of executing
it with effect." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AoENCY § 58 (1839). See also Id.
§§ 57, 85, 97; RPESTATE zNWT (SEcoN.m) oF AaENcY § 34(c) (1958); F. MECHEM, A TaEATISn ON
TnE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 280, 311 (1889).
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notorious manner.43 The existence of a structure for appealing a type of
decision by a particular official or class of officials is a recognition of the
authority of that official or class to make a decision of that sort.44
As a practical matter, the application of this principle will attach new
consequences to the presence or absence of guidance provided to subordinate
employees by supervisory or final authorities. If a sheriff in a town with
no established rules or practices tells his deputy to go find evidence, the
town's decision as to whether to search a house without a warrant will for
all practical purposes have been delegated to the deputy; in a police depart-
ment with clear and enforced rules regarding searches and seizures, an officer
who breaks into a house in violation of those rules would exercise no such
delegated authority. This will provide an incentive to government authorities
to exercise care in choosing the employees to whom they delegate policy-
making authority, and to formulate those policies that may involve consti-
tutional problems at a higher level.45
3. The Rules Rule. What has been said about delegated authority
generally suggests one specific and relatively straightforward application. If a
government employee establishes a rule which is to be and is in fact obeyed
by other government employees, the rule should ordinarily be deemed to be
within the policymaking authority of the first employee.
What government employees actually do is a substantial guide to the
scope of their authority although it is not conclusive, since an employee
could personally establish and carry out a policy without the knowledge
of his superiors. In the case of a rule, however, that policy is not only known
to other employees, but also regarded by them as so clearly authorized as
to be binding on them. The existence of delegated authority is testified to
by the conduct of other employees who are familiar with government
practice, who have a personal interest in refusing to obey any order that
may violate government policy, and who have a ready method of challenging
any arguably unauthorized order. Policymaking authority is, as a practical
43. "Deeply embedded traditional ways" of making state policy, like similar ways of
carrying out that policy, "are often tougher and truer law than the dead word of written
text." See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 691 n.56 (quoting Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940)). See also text accompanying notes
60-79 in ra.
44. The aggrieved individual is under no obligation to take such an appeal. See McNeese
v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). Where an appeal is taken, however, attention must
be paid to the allocation of authority between the initial and appellate decisionmakers,
especially if the gravamen of the constitutional claim is improper motivation on the part of
the former. If the appellate decisionmaker reconsiders the entire matter de novo, that will
often eliminate any taint arising from the motives of the initial decisionmaker, since the same
final result would have occurred regardless of those motives. See Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977). On the other hand, where
the appellate process leaves part of the decision in the hands of the initial decisionmaker,
such as by deferring to his judgment, expertise, recommendation, or fact finding, by applying
a not clearly erroneous rule, or by rejecting the appeal on procedural grounds, the initial
decision is an act of delegated authority for which the entity should be held responsible.
45. This is consistent with the agency rule that "it is the duty of the principal if he
desires an authority to be executed in a particular manner, to make his terms so clear and
unambiguous that they cannot reasonably be misconstrued." F. McSmEE, supra note 42, § 314.
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matter, not the ability to write procedures or standards on a particular piece
of paper, but the power to establish a standard of conduct which will be
followed by government employees regarding a particular subject matter. If
final or higher authorities, by a combination of practices and rules, confer
that power on an employee, so that other employees believe that the latter
has delegated authority and obey rules he or she promulgates, the govern-
ment cannot later assert that this delegation of power and authority was not
official, or that the higher authorities whose action resulted in such a delega-
tion did not intend that result.
This accords with the common sense notion of when an action "may
fairly be said to represent official policy." Where doubt exists among
subordinate employees as to which of two supervisory officials has the
authority to establish policy on a given subject, the acts of employees obeying
whichever supervisor they believe to have that authority must be regarded
as carrying out official policy within the meaning of Monell regardless of
how the dispute between the supervisors is ultimately resolved. If the De-
partment of Social Services had a written rule, routinely obeyed by depart-
mental managers and personnel officers, requiring the dismissal of pregnant
employees, it would seem only the most peculiar of technicalities to claim
that these dismissals were not the result of "official policy" because only the
city civil service commission could make personnel policies. Such an
assertion might be an accurate description of the legal structure of the city,
but it would certainly not comport with what a disinterested observer would
characterize as a fair description of official policy.
Different considerations apply to a single directive to subordinate
officials and the policy that may be involved. In such a case the subordinate
employees may not, as a practical matter, be in a position to question the
authority of the directive, at least not without also delaying or preventing
execution of the directive and thus, or otherwise, risking serious sanctions
if the questioned directive was proper. If a police sergeant directs his men to
break down a particular door, the fact that they obey is not conclusive
evidence that they thought he had authority to issue that order. However,
a series of specific supervisory instructions amounting to a pattern or
practice, such as an ongoing program of burglarizing the offices of a dissi-
dent political group, would be comparable to a rule if the subordinates
involved knew that such directives would continue to be issued and, despite
the opportunity thus created to question the authority for such directives, did
not doubt that such authority existed.
4. Responsibility for State and Federally Mandated Policies. Fre-
quently the policies of a city are formulated in the context of the city's
relationship to or joint activities with the state or federal government. At
times a state or federal law expressly authorizes a particular policy. In such
a case the selection of the policy remains in the untrammeled discretion of
the city, and the situation is not materially different from that in which state
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and federal law is simply silent. Often the state or federal government offers
financial or other assistance to a city on the condition that the city adopt
particular policies, especially policies pertaining to the manner in which that
assistance will be implemented. Here again the city is free to reject both
the aid and thus the conditions attached to it, and the decision to adopt the
policies tied to that aid remains the city's responsibility. If a private party
offered to give the city a park on the condition that the city forbid blacks
to use it, no one would seriously question the city's liability for implementing
such an exclusionary policy;46 the result should be no different if the donor
is a governmental entity.
A distinct problem arises where state or federal law imposes on the
city an absolute obligation to adopt and implement a particular policy. This
is not, however, the problem to which Monell's requirement of an "official
policy" was addressed, for Monell was concerned only to exclude vicarious
liability for the acts of errant employees. If a city council enacts, and a
mayor personally implements, a particular policy, that is an "official policy"
for purposes of Monell, and the city remains a "person" regardless of
whether the council and mayor acted to comply with some federal or state
mandate. Imposing liability on the city under such circumstances would be
no more "vicarious" than imposing liability on a subsidiary company for
obeying the dictates of its parent firm. The question remains, however,
whether a city whose policies have caused a constitutional violation should
be able to avoid monetary liability by proving that its policies were adopted
in obedience to higher authorities. As a practical measure this issue will
arise primarily with regard to state laws, since most federally imposed require-
ments are merely conditions of federal financial assistance.
This issue would be of little importance if the states themselves were
subject to suit under section 1983, for it would control only which entity
was to pay the judgment. But Quern v. Jordan 47 holds that states are not
"persons" under section 1983, and thus are not available defendants. Thus
if a city could defend an action on the ground that its conduct was mandated
by state law, the victim of the constitutional violation involved would be left
without a remedy. Such a doctrine would in effect permit a state to extend
its eleventh amendment immunity to cities and counties, and thus to partially
nullify repeated Supreme Court decisions that local governments are not
covered by the amendment. 48
The Reconstruction amendments draw no distinctions between cities
and states; they are all part of a single entity, and the conduct of any of their
officials is state action. The state of New York and the city of New York,
may, as a matter of local politics, regard one another as hostile foreign
powers, but the fourteenth amendment attaches no significance to such
46. See generally Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
47. 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979).
48. Mt. Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 529-30 (1890).
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differences. The eleventh amendment was not intended to license consti-
tutional violations at the hands of state officials, but merely to place the
state treasuries beyond the reach of the federal judiciary. If a state wants to
carry out a policy through a government entity whose treasury does not
enjoy that protection, it must run the risk that that treasury will be used to
remedy any constitutional violation involved. Its situation is analogous to
that of a foreign corporation beyond the reach of service in a given state
which chooses to direct a subsidiary within the state to take tortious action.
If the Forty-second Congress had thought it inappropriate that cities be
held liable for carrying out state mandated policies, it would not have
permitted suits against cities at all, for that Congress regarded everything
a city did as merely implementing such policies. Proponents of the 1871
Civil Rights Act, such as Senator Edmunds, stressed that each city and
county was a "State organism" in order to establish that they were, like
states, subject to the commands of the fourteenth amendment and thus to
the control of Congress.49 Opponents of the bill, who maintained that Con-
gress did not have power to control the affairs of the states, rejected any
suggestion that cities or counties were independent or autonomous bodies.
They described cities and counties as "local State governments" and "integral
parts of States." " Thus federal legislation which restricted the conduct of
cities and counties was attacked as violating "the local rights of the States," "
absorbing the "jurisdiction of the States over their local and domestic
affairs" 52 and taking from the states their "local and municipal powers and
duties." 53
This equation of cities and states was developed further in opposition
to the Sherman Amendment. Representative Kerr argued that local govern-
ment units were merely administrative branches of the state government.
"[C]ities and counties .. .are a part of the machinery of a State Govern-
ment. They are divisions which the State itself makes as mere agencies and
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing its own laws and its own local
policy." 64 Several distinct arguments were founded on this analysis. First,
it was urged, in what Monell viewed as the critical contention raised against
the Amendment,5 5 that the then existing constitutional prohibition against
federal statutes imposing duties on state officials would apply to the imposi-
tion of such duties "upon county and town organizations, the mere instru-
mentality for the administration of State law." " Second, Representative
49. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 756 (1871).
50. Id. at 337 (remarks of Rep. Witthorne), 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck), 777 (remarks
of Rep. Frelinghuysen).
51. Id. at 337 (remarks of Rep. Witthorne). See also id. at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox)
(defends "the State governments, with their local rights").
52. Id. at 366 (remarks of Rep. Arthur).
53. Id. at 357 (remarks of Rep. Beck).
54. Id. at 793.
55. 436 U.S. at 673-83.
56. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Poland). This is
the passage which Monroe v. Pape regarded as controlling the construction of § 1983. See
365 U.S. at 190. Representative Blair advanced the same argument. "It was held also in the
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Bingham argued that the unlimited financial liability faced by "an integral
part of the State, a county" could destroy not only the county, but would
ipso facto, and impermissibly, destroy the state of which it was a part.57
Third, it was suggested that whatever the constitutional duties of a state, it
was for the state alone to determine which state agencies were to carry
them out, and thus cities and counties, like any other state agencies, were
"subject only to such duties and liabilities as State laws impose upon them." 51
Since Congress felt that cities and counties always acted as "mere
instrumentalities of state law," it cannot have intended that this constitute a
defense to an action under section 1983, because it would have nullified
Congress's decision to make cities and counties liable for constitutional viola-
tions.
Such a rule, moreover, would be an irresistible invitation to evasion of
Monell. A city which wanted to adopt a policy which it knew or feared was
unconstitutional could avoid liability merely by having the policy 'enacted
into a state statute applicable only to that city. Thus New York City would
have been immune from damages in Monell if state law had required the
dismissal of pregnant employees. In some states, including New York, it
is common for the internal affairs of cities and counties to be regulated by
state statutes applying to only a single city. If a city cannot immunize itself
merely by adopting a city ordinance forbidding a particular constitutional
violation,15 surely it cannot acquire such immunity by procuring the adoption
of a state statute requiring that violation. Even where such legislation was
not sought for the purpose of nullifying Moneil, the existence of such a
defense would embroil much post-Monell litigation in disputes as to whether
a city policy was mandated by state law, regulation, order, or less formal
direction, and whether the existence of that command was in fact known to
the city employees who adopted or implemented the policy which was or
caused the constitutional violation. Both the practical and procedural
consequences of permitting the existence of an unconstitutional state policy to
immunize official city action are palpably inconsistent with the purposes of
section 1983.
B. Customs and Usages
Persons whose actions are regarded as "official policy" are not the only
ones who can subject a municipality to liability after Monell. Section 1983
provides broadly that any person who while acting "under color of any statute,
case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania [41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842)] that it is not within the power
of the Congress of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer; that we cannot
command a State officer to do any duty whatever as such; and I ask the gentlemen to show
me the difference between that and commanding a municipality, which is equally the creature
of the State, to perform a duty." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871).
57. Id. at 798.
58. Id. at 794 (remarks of Rep. Poland).
59. See text accompanying notes 80-98 infra.
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ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State" violates the constitu-
tional rights of another may be sued for appropriate redress. The civil rights
acts of 1866 60 and 1870 61 had both provided for civil liability "notwith-
standing" any laws and customs, and both provided criminal liability for
actions under color of laws and customs, but civil liability based on custom
was first imposed by section 1 of the 1871 Act. Since the earlier criminal
provisions applied only to individuals, neither earlier statute concerned action
by a government pursuant to custom. In view of this origin of the "under
color of" clause of section 1983, it might have been urged that "custom" in
that clause had no application to actions against a government entity. Monell
states, however, that "local governments, like every other section 1983 'per-
son,' by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional depriva-
tions visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom
has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking
channels." 62
Litigation as to what is meant by "governmental customs" may well be
confused by the inclusion in Monell of quotations from two earlier opinions
concerned with rather different applications of the term "customs". Monell
quotes Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. holding that "practices . . .could well
be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with
the force of law." 63 The issue in Adickes was what types of customs could
render otherwise private conduct "state action" 64 and the Court there held
that a custom which had the coercive force of law was necessary. But the
degree of permanence required to give a custom this coercive effect on private
citizens 65 bears no necessary connection to the characteristics of a custom
which would render it "governmental." In Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Railway v. Browning,66 the Court had held that, "[s]ettled state
practice ... can establish what is state law." That passage, also quoted in
Monell, was in the context of a decision that taxing railroad property at a
higher rate than other property was not discrimination, even though not
formally authorized by state statute, since the practice was so uniformly
followed as to constitute a de facto amendment of the statute. Which cus-
toms are so settled as to function as such an amendment is again not the
same issue as what types of customs are "governmental."
Monell also quotes a passage from Adickes which does bear directly
on the question at hand. "'Congress included such customs and usage [in
section 19831 because of persistent and widespread discriminatory practices
60. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
61. Ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140.
62. 436 U.S. at 690-91.
63. 398 U.S. 144, 168 (1970).
64. The particular dispute was whether the refusal of Kress to serve an integrated group
of customers was "under color of law ... or custom." Id. at 162-71.
65. In both its ordinary and legal meaning a usage, as distinguished from a custom,
never has the "force of law." See note 79 infra.
66. 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940).
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of state officials.' 67 The practice with which Congress was especially con-
cerned was the systematic refusal of local law enforcement officials to en-
force state criminal laws against members of the Ku Klux Klan and others
who attacked blacks and Republicans. State law did not sanction or permit
such discrimination, 68 and in some cases the highest state officials were Re-
publicans 69 who opposed that discrimination, but the individual state em-
ployees who actually had to carry out the administration of the criminal law
pursued that practice nonetheless. As Representative Perry noted, "Sheriffs,
having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not .... In
the presence of these gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil govern-
ment, all the processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice
were crimes and feared detection." 70 The Forty-second Congress regarded
such a failure to enforce state laws as the quintessential violation of the equal
protection clause. 71 In some instances those state employees, especially
sheriffs and deputies, actually joined in the criminal activities. 72 The states
themselves were criticized, not for actively supporting the violence or formally
sanctioning the lack of law enforcement, but for "failing" or "neglecting" to
curb this practice of non-enforcement by local judges and sheriffs.73
The unconstitutional customs with which the supporters of section 1983
were concerned were thus not "customary" or informal exercises of final or
delegated authorities, but the widespread and persistent practices of ordinary
sheriffs, judges, and prosecutors. That is entirely consistent with the phrase
"custom or usage," because the general practices of government officials
would ordinarily be described in just such terms regardless of the rank of
the officials involved. The frequency and pattern of the practice alleged to
be a custom or usage must be sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference
that the public employer and its employees are aware that public employees
engage in the practice and do so with impunity.74 This is consistent with
the agency principle well established in 1871 that principals are presumed to
67. 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 167).
68. Opponents of the 1871 Act argued unsuccessfully that the fourteenth amendment
applied only to discrimination on the face of state statutes. See text accompanying
notes 84-89 infra. See also Note, Municipal Liability under Section 1983: The Meaning of
"Policy or Custom," 79 CoLTJm. L. REv. 304, 309 (1979).
69. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Butler),
478-81 (remarks of Rep. Leach).
70. Id. app. at 78.
71. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. 322 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Stoughton), 429
(remarks of Rep. Beatty), 448 (remarks of Rep. Butler), 457, 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn),
476 (remarks of Rep. Dawes), 486 (remarks of Rep. Cook), 604, 608 (remarks of Sen.
Pool), id. app., at 83 (remarks of Rep. Bingham), 114 (remarks of Sen. Farnsworth), 153
(remarks of Rep. Garfield), 251 (remarks of Sen. Morton). See also Note, supra note 68,
at 309-11.
72. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 172 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Pool), 183
(remarks of Rep. Platt). See also id. app., at 201 (remarks of Rep. Snyder).
73. See notes 149-51 and accompanying text infra.
74. See RpSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 43 (1958). As Comment (a) notes,
"Persons ordinarily express dissent to acts done on their behalf which they have not authorized
or of which they do not approve." See also I. STORY, supra note 42, § 87 (authority of agent
can arise "by implication by numerous acts, done by the agent with the tacit consent or
acquiescence of the principle").
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have authorized agents to act consistent with "publically known ... custom
or usage." 75 A practice which is extremely widespread would be sufficient
even though recent in origin; the official tolerance towards racial and political
violence with which Congress was concerned in 1871 was thought to have
arisen only in the previous year or two.76  The rule could not sensibly be
otherwise with regard to the practices of officials regarding a newly dis-
covered problem. 77 If a practice is of long standing, a smaller rate of official
participation will be necessary to qualify it as a custom. The inference would
be equally warranted if a high percentage of officials engaged in the practice
or if a substantial number did so, even though the pool of officials might be
even larger. Thus a custom of segregating children within classrooms could
be demonstrated by proof that it was practiced by half of the teachers in a
school system with twenty .teachers or by one hundred teachers in a system
with one thousand teachers.
The gravity of the conduct is also relevant, for the greater the harm
involved the greater the likelihood that a given number of unsanctioned in-
cidents will convey an impression of official tolerance. Thus, a lower rate
of police brutality would be needed to prove a police custom than the rate
needed to show a custom of not reading Miranda warnings. Adickes held
that a practice may be a state custom within the meaning of section 1983
though not of state-wide application, 78 and that is doubtless true of city or
county customs as well. State or city laws do not always apply to all areas
within their jurisdiction, and there is no reason why customs need do so.
Thus, if -the police gave Miranda warnings to ninety percent of all suspects
city-wide, but only to fifty percent of the suspects arrested in a predominantly
black neighborhood, an inference of custom would be proper as to that
neighborhood but not as to the city as a whole.79
75. F. MECHEM, supra note 42, §§ 76-78, 96.
76. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 105 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Pool).
77. As the Supreme Court noted in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173
(1970), a plaintiff could not be expected to show that as of 1964 a Mississippi restaurant had
a long standing policy of serving only the blacks in an integrated group, since until shortly
before that time blacks could not have obtained service at all.
78. Id.
79. In addition to "custom," § 1983 also refers to a state "usage." In ordinary speech
these two terms generally regarded as synonymous. WNBSrER's NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY
280, 1288 (1973). In contractual transactions a distinction appears to exist; a "usage" being
a generally accepted commercial rule which the courts will enforce unless the agreement and
understanding of the parties was to the contrary, while a "custom," though possibly also
originating in commercial practice, was a rule so established that the courts would enforce it
regardless of that agreement and understanding. 5 WIILISrON ON CONTr crs § 649 (3d ed.
1961); see Gulf Ref. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 32 F.2d 555, 557 (2d Cir. 1929). In other legal
contexts no clear distinction is apparent, the terms being used to describe the entire body of
non-statutory law, the actual practices of judges and other officials, and practices of the public
which had acquired the force or protection of the law. See 2 BLACgsrnoNE'S COMMENTARIES
98 (Tucker ed. 1803) ("custom" imposing limits on "fines" in tenancy); id. at 213 ("custom"
dictates male preference in inheritance). Compare 7 OxFORD ENoLisH DICTrIOmARY 1283
(custom) with 10 id. at 467 (usage). Where adherence to the practice is not imposed or
enforced by superior officials, and each employee is free to follow it or not as he pleases,
the employees enjoy de facto delegated authority to decide whether to pursue the practice, a
state of affairs most analogous to a usage. The authority conveyed by usage to an agent
included the authority to take some action or not (e.g., sell on credit) at his discretion.
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C. Prophylactic Rules
The application of section 1983 and Monell presents particular difficulty
where, whatever the actual practice, there is a formal, even written, policy
forbidding the particular constitutional violation. Despite such a nominal
policy, violations of it are "state action" for constitutional purposes,80 and
Monroe holds they are "under color of law" within the meaning of section
1983.81 But whether such practices may nonetheless be fairly described as
the actions of the city within the meaning of Monell presents a different
question.
If the mere existence of such a written policy were sufficient to insulate
a city from liability for actions to the contrary, a city could completely
immunize itself from liability by the simple expedient of adopting the lan-
guage of the fourteenth, amendment and other applicable constitutional
provisions as a city ordinance. Indeed, a city could already argue that the
supremacy clause makes the Constitution part of the city law and policy, and
that any city officials who act in violation of the Constitution, including the
members of the city council who adopt an ordinance, do not act on behalf
of the city itself. Such an approach would render Monell a dead letter.82
The legislative history of section 1983 demonstrates that the proponents
of that measure attached little significance to formally adopted state policies
which did not represent the actual practices of state officials. Throughout
the debates on the 1871 Civil Rights Act, supporters and opponents argued
about the meaning of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, particularly
the equal protection clause. This dispute arose particularly because section 3
of the Act provided that if certain forms of domestic violence should violate
federally protected rights by obstructing the enforcement of state law, and
if state authorities failed or neglected to protect those rights, "such facts
shall be deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of the laws." 83
Opponents of the Act argued that section 3 was unconstitutional, and
that section 1 was unnecessary,8 because the equal protection clause applied
only to state statutes. Senator Vickers urged, with regard to that clause,
"Legislation by the State is expressly referred to, and no State has the power
or the capacity, to deny the rights referred to, except by legislation." 85
J. STORY, supra note 42, § 77. Where, however, higher officials do compel implementation
of the practice, the situation is closer to a custom.
80. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
81. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961).
82. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Supporters of the 1871 Civil
Rights Act accused opponents of taking precisely this position. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 696 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
83. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
84. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 268 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Sloss); see
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 173.
85. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 661 (1871). See also id. app., at 259 (remarks
of Rep. Holman).
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Senator Blair insisted that the proper constitutional inquiry should stop with
a reading of state legislation:
[iThe amendment did not contemplate an inquisition by the courts
of the United States or by Congress into the practical administration
of justice by the State authorities . . . .It was the laws, not the
magistrates, of the State which were to be set aside if found in
conflict with the Constitution, and the United States is not war-
ranted in interfering further than to prevent the enforcement by the
officers of the State of any law of the State which abridges the rights
of a citizen or denies him the equal protection of the law.80
Senator Thurman objected that, as used in section 5, "state" signified only
"the government of the State. It is not simply some judge sitting in Almance
county; he is not the State of North Carolina; much less some constable or
sheriff in Caswell county .... ," 87 Numerous opponents asserted that no
statutes had been enacted by southern states which were unconstitutional on
their face,88 and insisted that the southern states had met their constitutional
responsibilities because each had "a penal code to punish wicked men for
their crimes and misdemeanors." 89
But a majority of the Forty-second Congress refused to attach such
conclusive significance to the adoption of legislation which gave nominal
protection to the blacks and Republicans who were the victims of Ku Klux
Klan violence. Congress had "no quarrel with the state laws on the books.
It was their lack of enforcement that was the nub of the difficulty." 00
Without such enforcement the rights guaranteed by the Constitution would
be merely "nominal." 9 Senator Edmunds, the Senate sponsor of the bill,
rejected the limited construction of the fourteenth amendment advanced by
the bill's opponents. Actually protecting citizens, he insisted, was the
obligation of the state and traditionally a matter for state judges and sheriffs,
not the legislature.
But what is the State? Is it the Legislature? It is as to making
law, with the aid of a Governor. As to enforcing a law, is the
Legislature the State? How do Legislatures enforce laws? I had
been taught in my little reading and experience in the professsion
of the law that the enforcement of the law belonged to the judiciary
and the executive combined.... A Legislature acting directly does
not afford to any person the protection of the law; it makes the
86. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 118 (1871).
87. Id. app., at 221. See also CoNa. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 431 (1871) (remarks of
Rep. McHenry), 661 (remarks of Rep. Vickers); id. app., at 118 (remarks of Sen. Blair).
88. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 396 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Rice), 455 (remarks
of Rep. Cox), 600 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury), 661 (remarks of Sen. Vickers); Id. app., at
208 (remarks of Rep. Blair), 268 (remarks of Rep. Sloss), 306 (remarks of Rep. Slater).
89. Id. at 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry).
90. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 176.
91. CoNG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kelly).
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law under which and through which, being executed by the func-
tionaries, citizens receive the protection of the law.92
If section 1 applied only to legislators, he argued, "the executive and the
judicial departments of the State are not prohibited from enforcing any law
they, please which violates the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States."9 3  Representative Garfield read the equal protection clause
in a similar manner: "The laws must not only be equal on their face, but
they must be so administered that equal protection under them shall not be
denied to any class of citizens, either by the courts or the executive officers
of the State." 9- Representative Stevenson suggested that denials of equal
protection were most likely to result from a failure to enforce laws fair on
their face:
Denial may . . . be either active or passive. It is more fre-
quently passive than active....
Gentlemen contend that this provision will operate only where
a State fails to pass equal laws and excludes a class of citizens from
protection; but the language is "equal protection of the laws." The
words "the laws" imply existing laws, and the benefit secured is
the "protection" of the laws, and this requires their execution.
Unexecuted laws are no "protection." 95
This clear congressional emphasis on the actual conduct of government
officials compels the conclusion that the mere adoption of fair laws or
policies is insufficient to immunize a city from a duty not to violate the
Constitution or from monetary liability for such violations. A prophylactic
policy is only as significant as the actual practices for implementing that
policy and for detecting, redressing, and sanctioning violations of it. The
actual conduct of city officials is the acid test of what city policy is. Where
a particular issue arises so infrequently, or where actual practices leave the
nature of the city policy in doubt for other reasons, the formal policy would
be of some significance. The existence of uniform and vigorous enforce-
ment activities 96 would strongly suggest that a written policy against a
particular violation could fairly be described as that of the city. Conversely,
92. Id. at 696-97. See Note, supra note 68, at 309-15.
93. CONG. GLOBB, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 696 (1871). See also id. at 505 (remarks of Sen.
Pratt) (laws fair on their face were administered unfairly); id. app., at 116 (remarks of Rep.
Shellabarger) (§ 1 of fourteenth amendment covers "administration of the law").
94. Id. app., at 153.
95. Id. app., at 300. See also id. app., at 315 (remarks of Rep. Burchard) (if "judicial
authorities wrongfully enforce the law," the state denies equal protection), 333-34 (remarks
of Rep. Hoar); Note, supra note 68, at 309-13.
96. Frequently violations will occur with such speed or finality that the enforcement role
of higher authorities would be limited to preventing, redressing, and punishing violations of
the prophylactic rules. In some cases it may be possible to appeal the intended violation
before it is implemented. If in such a case it is suggested that the prophylactic rule has been
violated, a failure to investigate that claim would usually be fatal to a defense based on the
existence of the rule. Where an investigation occurs but the violation is erroneously not dis-
covered, inquiry must be made as to seriousness, detail, and standards of the investigation.
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the very existence of such a written policy, together with well-known and
tolerated violations, 97 would be persuasive evidence that the actual policy of
city authorities was to permit the practices to which the city was ostensibly
opposed.98 The mere existence of a written prophylactic rule, however,
will ordinarily add little by itself to the process of determining whether a
particular constitutional violation was properly regarded as a city policy.
D. Causing a Constitutional Violation
Although Monell requires that municipal liability under section 1983
be grounded on a city policy, that policy need not itself be a violation of the
Constitution. Section 1983 imposes liability on any city which "shall subject
or cause to be subjected" any person to a deprivation of constitutional rights.
Where the city's policy is ipso facto a constitutional violation, the city
directly subjects people to such a deprivation. Congress apparently attached
distinct importance to the "cause to be subjected" language (the cause
clause), since it used that language selectively in some but not all provisions
of the civil rights acts of 1866 and 1870.99 Monell itself emphasizes the
independent significance of the clause,100 and describes the relationship
between a policy and a constitutional violation in terms of causation rather
than identity. 101
1. Interpreting the Cause Clause. On its face the cause clause could
have three possible meanings: that the policy was intended to cause the
constitutional violation, that the policy foreseeably caused the violation, or
that the policy unforeseeably caused the violation. Under the first con-
struction the clause would be so narrow as to add virtually nothing to section
1983; certainly in the case of discrimination on the basis of race or political
affiliation, the violations with which the 1871 Act was particularly concerned,
any violation would ipso facto be intentional. 0 2  On the other hand, the
97. See, e.g., Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 116, 127 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), where a city ordinance had been narrowly construed to render it constitutional,
but the city's policy, with the knowledge of higher officials, was to make arrests forbidden by
that construction.
98. Such circumstances might also indicate that the "rule" was advisory rather than bind-
ing in nature. See RaSTATEMENT (Sacoem) OF AGENcY § 34(a) & Comment (1958).
99. The clause is used in the criminal provision of the 1866 Act, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27,
and carried forward into the similar provision of the 1870 Act, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 140.
100. 436 U.S. at 691-92.
101. The relationship is described in four different passages: (1) The unconstitutional
action must "implement" or "execute" a policy. Id. at 690. (2) The policy must be "re-
sponsible for" the violation. Id. (3) The policy must have "caused a constitutional
tort." Id. at 691. (4) Execution of the policy must "inflict[] the injury." Id. at 694. The
first and fourth descriptions may be roughly equivalent, but are clearly narrower than the
second and third. Nothing in the context in which they are used suggests that execution of
a policy is the only sufficient causal relationship. Clearly the only internally consistent con-
struction of Monell is that execution of a policy is but an example of the ways in which a
policy may cause a violation within the meaning of § 1983. See also Note, supra note 68,
at 315-18.
102. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). If the clause referred only to a
policy intended to cause a particular practice by employees, it would add nothing, since such
a practice would also be ipso facto an official policy. The clause cannot refer to a practice
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third construction would be too broad for it would result in a rule at least as
sweeping as the respondeat superior principle rejected in Monell.108 The mere
act of hiring a policeman, or maintenance of a police force, is a causal element
in an incident of police brutality; liability based solely on that sort of causal
connection would include liability for any act of any municipal employee.
The most plausible construction of the cause clause is that it includes
official policies which entail an unreasonable foreseeable risk of causing a
constitutional violation.10 4 What must have been foreseeable under this
construction is the occurrence of the acts or omissions which constituted the
violation; whether the final or delegated authorities knew or should have
known that those acts or omissions were unconstitutional raises different
issues which are discussed below.10 5
This construction is supported by the distinction between direct and
vicarious liability drawn by other provisions of the 1871 Act and recognized
by Monell. The Court in Monell describes the Sherman amendment as
imposing "a species of vicarious liability on municipalities since it could be
construed to impose liability even if a municipality did not know of an
impending or ensuing riot or did not have the wherewithal to do anything
about it." 101 Section 6 of the Act, which replaced the Sherman amendment,
imposed liability on any person who knew that the violations described in
section 2 107 "were about to be committed" and had the "power to prevent
or aid in preventing the same," but nonetheless "neglect[ed] or refuse[d] so
to do." 108 Section 6 clearly does not require that this inaction be motivated
by a desire to cause a constitutional injury; mere "neglect" is sufficient. A
government that adopts a policy which foreseeably results in a constitutional
violation can fairly be said to know that the violation is likely to occur and
to have failed to use its power, by simply adopting a different policy, to
prevent that occurrence.
The debates on the Sherman Amendment reflect a similar emphasis on
whether city authorities were on notice that there was danger of a riot
coupled with an intent to violate the Constitution, for that type of intent was expressly re-
quired by section 2 of the 1871 Act in different terms. See text accompanying notes 141-60
infra.
103. The application of this standard in only limited circumstances, rather than across
the board, would not pose this problem. In view of the general use of tort principles, strict
liability for acts or policies causing constitutional violations would be appropriate in those
special situations in which there was strict liability at common law. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern,
407 F.2d 781, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1969) (false imprisonment).
104. In the world of human events, the consequence of a policy can rarely if ever be
foreseen with absolute certainty. Tort law has traditionally based direct liability on the likeli-
hood of the threatened injury together with the magnitude of the injury involved. It might
be inappropriate to impose monetary liability on a city for a policy which foreseeably entailed
a one in ten chance that a city employee would be discharged without a hearing, but it would
clearly be proper to impose such liability on a city for a policy which foreseeably entailed a
one in ten chance that a prison guard would kill an inmate on the basis of race. The cost
of avoiding the risk of constitutional injury would also be relevant to the reasonableness of
the policy.
105. See text accompanying notes 133-216 infra.
106. 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976).
108. Id. § 1986 (1976).
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covered by section 2 and could have stopped it. Senator Stevenson objected
that the Amendment imposed liability "for personal injury which no prudence
or foresight could have prevented." 109 Senator Thurman urged that the
state laws on which the Amendment was based required, as the Amendment
did not, that the authorities had "good reason to believe that such riot or
tumultuous assembly was about to take place." 110 Opponents of the Amend-
ment objected generally that it departed from the usual requirement of
neglect.' This argument was consistent with the allegations of state mis-
conduct which had earlier been advanced by supporters of the Act, who had
characterized that misconduct with such tort-like terms as "neglect," 112
"default," 113 and "faithless." 114 In explaining section 6 of the Act on
behalf of the Senate conferees, Senator Edmunds emphasized that it imposed
liability only on those who "had reasonable notice of the fact that there was
a tumult, or was likely to be one, and neglected to take the means necessary
to prevent it." 115 Thus a failure to use a realistic ability to prevent a fore-
seeable violation is the critical factor by which Congress distinguished
between holding a defendant responsible for its own conduct and imposing
impermissibly "vicarious" liability.
The cause clause so construed will serve an important role in assuring
that high level policymaking government officials do not cavalierly disregard
the constitutional ramifications of their actions. If responsible officials are
aware that a subordinate is violating the Constitution and take no action to
stop him, or fail to investigate substantial allegations of such violations, the
city can properly be held liable for subsequent violations by that employee
and by others encouraged by his unpunished example. Even absent such an
individual history of misconduct, if city employees are to be placed in a posi-
tion where constitutional violations are likely in the absence of adequate
training or supervision, 116 either because of special pressures or particularly
detailed constitutional requirements, a policy of not providing that training
or supervision would render the city liable for the resulting violations. A
city which authorized police officers to make searches without instructing
them as to the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment would be as
liable for ensuing unlawful searches as if it had an express policy of dis-
regarding those requirements. As with the selection of an independent con-
tractor by an employer, the city would also be subject to liability for a policy
109. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1871).
110. Id. at 773. See also id. at 788 (remarks of Rep. Kerr).
111. Id. at 762 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson), 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard), 794 (re-
marks of Rep. Poland).
112. Id. at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar), 448 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id. app., at 72(remarks of Rep. Blair), 153 (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See also CoNo. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 338 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Witthorne), 574 (remarks of Sen. Stockton).
113. Id. at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon).
114. Id. at 389 (remarks of Rep. Elliott).
115. Id. at 821.
116. This is analogous to the liability of an employer for torts of independent contractors
engaged in inherently dangerous activities. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
472-74 (4th ed. 1971).
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of not exercising reasonable care in the selection of its employees.' 17 In
some cases, such as a failure to train, understanding the consequences of
that policy will require no special knowledge. Where particular knowl-
edge 118 is necessary to foresee the consequences of a policy or decision,
such as knowledge of the proclivities of an errant employee, that knowledge
must be in the possession of one or more of those officials "whose duty it
was to repress" 119 such violations or to convey that knowledge to such offi-
cials. Thus, it would be sufficient if a police officer's penchant for beating
prisoners were known to his supervisors, but not if it were known only to a
city file clerk to whom he was married.
The cause clause will have an important application to the types of
problems involved in Rizzo v. Goode. 20 Rizzo held that an injunction de-
signed to prevent or redress constitutional violations could not be issued
against supervisory city officials unless the officials had some personal re-
sponsibility for those violations. In light of MonelI it appears that the out-
come of Rizzo resulted in part from the fact that, under Monroe, only the
mayor but not the city of Philadelphia was then an available defendant. The
legal responsibilities of a supervisor for misconduct of his subordinates have
traditionally been limited to circumstances of direct involvement by the
superior in the misconduct.12 But the liability of an employer for the ac-
tions of even an independent contractor has always been broader, since such
an employer faces liability where it knew the contractor was likely to cause
injury and failed to take preventative measures. 22 Monell describes Rizzo
as holding that "the mere right to control without any control or direction
having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to
support § 1983 liability." 123 The implication of this sentence is that either
an exercise of control or a failure to supervise would be sufficient to support
such liability.
The circumstances under which a city is liable for injunctive relief may
well be broader than those in which monetary relief would be ordered. City
117. Id. at 469.
118. In some circumstances constructive knowledge would doubtless be sufficient. Al-
though § 6 required that the defendant have "knowledge" that certain offenses were likely,
Senator Edmunds explained that it included "outrages of which he had notice, or of which
he might have had notice with reasonable diligence." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 824
(1871). The opponents of the original Sherman Amendment complained that it applied even if
there were "a total absence of notice, constructive or implied." Id. at 788 (remarks of Rep.
Kerr).
119. Id. at 821 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
120. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
121. The principle of respondeat superior, even in ordinary tort law, has never been
applied to impose liability on a supervisor for the torts of a subordinate. W. PROSSER, supra
note 116, at 458; see, e.g., Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888). A mayor or police
chief is not the employer of an errant officer, but only a fellow employee of the city. See, e.g.,
Boettger v. Moore, 483 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1973); Wilkerson v. Mock, 403 F. Supp. 971,
974 (E.D. Pa. 1975); RESTATE MNT (SacoND) OF AGENCY §245, Comment h (1958).
122. W. PROSSER, supra note 116, at 469.
123. 436 U.S. at 694 n.58.
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of Kenosha v. Bruno 124 holds, and Monell reaffirms, 125 that the term "per-
son" does not "have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations
depending on the nature of the relief sought against them." But while cities
are "persons" for both injunctive and monetary actions, this does not mean
that the substantive standards for awarding such relief are identical. The
defenses discussed in section II clearly apply only to actions for damages;
conversely, the requirement, usually imposed in injunctive actions, of a danger
of future conduct, would not limit the award of monetary relief. In applying
the cause clause, a broader reading may be appropriate as to a claim for
injunctive relief 126 than for a claim for damages.
2. "Former" Policies as Causes. Once a government body adopts an
unconstitutional policy, it does not cease violating the law simply by rescind-
ing that policy. The government remains in violation of the Constitution
so long as its other practices, even though neutral on their face and in origin,
operate to perpetuate the effect of that past unconstitutional policy.127 The
"remoteness in time" of that past policy is irrelevant to the legality of present
practices which give it continuing effect. 128 The government has an affirma-
tive obligation to take whatever action is necessary to eliminate "root and
branch" any ongoing impact which has its origin in past unconstitutional
policies.120
These established constitutional principles have two important applica-
tions under Monell. First, because such a government unit has an affirma-
tive duty to eliminate the continued effects of its past policies, neither official
neutrality nor a good faith but ineffective effort to achieve that result are
sufficient to end official liability. This liability is not vicarious, for it has its
origin in an official policy. A sincere though unsuccessful attempt to end
such effects no more satisfies the government's obligation than an unsuccess-
ful effort to pay an obligation to a creditor would satisfy the underlying debt.
Second, one of the most likely ongoing effects would be the continua-
tion by subordinate officials of practices originally adopted pursuant to offi-
cial policy. The mere act of formally rescinding an unconstitutional policy
does not guarantee that government officials will not continue to implement
it. On the contrary, such a technical rescission when not accompanied by
vigorous efforts to enforce a new policy would tend to convey to lower level
employees the impression that the real policy remains the same and that a
pro forma change has been made solely for the sake of appearances or to
avoid litigation. Even absent such a perception, a long standing unconstitu-
tional policy may well create among government employees attitudes and
124. 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973).
125. 436 U.S. at 701 n.66.
126. For example, a one in ten chance that a policy will result in a Miranda violation
might be insufficient to award damages but sufficient to warrant an order directing a change
in that policy.
127. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
128. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210-11 (1973).
129. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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practices which will, if left alone, continue unabated despite a change in
both official policies and the officials who make them. The government's
obligation to prevent this should include whatever affirmative steps, includ-
ing procedures for aggressively detecting, punishing, and redressing new ap-
plications of the old policy, are reasonably feasible to bring about an im-
mediate and effective end to such practices. Where an unconstitutional
policy once existed, and subsequent to the formal adoption of a new policy
an employee takes an unconstitutional action of the sort which would have
implemented -the former policy,130 the government should bear a heavy burden
of establishing that the responsible employee would have acted in the same
way even had that former policy never been in effect.18 '
Both of these applications are illustrated by the situation which would
exist if a city were to formally end an established policy of assigning black
applicants only to poorly paid positions. As to blacks hired and assigned
on that basis in the past, the city would remain in violation, and back pay
liability would continue to accrue, until those employees were offered a
meaningful opportunity to transfer to the positions they would have held
but for the original discriminatory assignment. 32 And if, subsequent to the
formal change of policy, a city employee were nonetheless to engage in a
similar act of discrimination, the city would be liable for any resulting damage
absent a persuasive showing that the city had undertaken such a vigorous
and thorough effort to effectuate the new policy that the employee's act of
discrimination could not have had its origin in the old policy, but must have
been solely the result of personal prejudices personal in origin.
A court called upon to decide whether a constitutional violation was
the result of a governmental policy will have to resolve an array of ques-
tions. Due consideration for rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure will require that a trial court make specific findings as to each of the
matters-delegation, custom, etc.-put in issue. Where a plaintiff estab-
lishes repeated unpunished incidents of the employee conduct involved, that
should ordinarily be sufficient to shift to the government the burden of prov-
ing the absence of delegated authority, custom, and usage, and of establishing
130. Fine distinctions among the nuances of violations would not be appropriate. Where
the former policy was of discrimination in employment against women, it would be of no
significance that the old policy was achieved through discrimination in hiring, while the new
violation was one of discrimination in promotions.
131. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270 n.21 (1977).
132. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-74 (1976). Under title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976), a neutral practice
that perpetuates the effect of past discrimination is also a violation of the law, except where
that practice is a bona fide seniority system within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976). International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-55 (1977). In
such a case only the original assignment, but not the neutral seniority system which perpetuates
its effect, violates title VII. United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559-60 (1977).
No such distinction exists as a matter of constitutional law; all perpetuating practices are
unconstitutional.
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that its inaction had not caused the succeeding violations. Resolution of
these issues will require a particular sensitivity to the distinction between
vigorously enforced prophylactic rules and empty protestations of pious in-
tentions calculated only to placate the courts and the victims of constitutional
violations.
II. MUNICIPAL DEFENSES TO SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
The question of whether cities have any good faith defense under sec-
tion 1983 was left unresolved in Monell.8 3 The Court did note, however,
that cities cannot be afforded absolute immunity "lest our decision . . . 'be
drained of meaning.'" 134 Previous decisions regarding the immunities enjoyed
by various government officials have proceeded from the premise that "[t]he
legislative record [of section 1983] gives no clear indication that Congress
meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities." 135 As a result, the
Court has read an absolute immunity from damage actions for legislators, 30
judges, 137 and prosecutors 138 into section 1983. In the case of cities, how-
ever, there is no available common-law immunity which can be read into
section 1983. The only common-law immunity for governments was abso-
lute, and Monell expressly precludes application of that doctrine to section
1983 cases. Thus, any municipal defense must be derived from the legisla-
tive history and purposes of section 1983.139
The discussion which follows suggests that it would be inappropriate
to afford a city a "good faith" defense similar to that provided to executive
officials. 140  Such a defense for cities would frustrate the purpose of section
1983 as revealed by its legislative history. Furthermore, the policy considera-
tions supporting the particular form of immunity accorded to individuals are
largely inapplicable to municipal governments. A more limited form of
133. See 436 U.S. at 695 ("We have attempted only to sketch so much of the § 1983
cause of action against a local government as is apparent from the history of the 1871 Act
and our prior cases, and we expressly leave further development of this action to another
day.").
134. Id. at 701 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974).
135. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). That premise may well have been
erroneous. The legislative history of § 1983 is replete with uncontradicted assertions thatjudges could be sued under it. See CoNG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 365-66 (1871) (re-
marks of Rep. Arthur), 385 (remarks of Rep. Lewis); id. app., at 217 (remarks of Sen.
Thurman).
136. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
137. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
138. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
139. Immunity cannot simply be conferred on a city whenever the responsible government
officials were immune, since that would preclude any liability whatever for constitutional
violations occasioned by a statute or ordinance. Legislators enjoy absolute immunity even if
they knowingly adopt an unconstitutional ordinance, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951), but an ordinance is the quintessential example of an "official policy" for which
Monell would impose liability.
140. This doctrine was first enunciated in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and
developed further in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315-22 (1975), and Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246-50 (1974). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496-503
(1978).
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defense is proposed which reflects the purpose and history of section 1983
as well as the standards of reasonable care in tort law.
A. The Language and Purposes of Section 1983
1. The Statutory Language. Congress's failure to require proof that
a section 1983 defendant has intentionally violated the Constitution is par-
ticularly strong evidence of its desire that such defendants should not be
easily immunized. It is clear that this failure was not inadvertent. Unlike
section 1983, which contains no reference to the motive of the defendant in
a civil action, section 1985 (which was section 2 of the 1871 Act) requires
that in certain criminal prosecutions there must be proof of a "purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws." 141 This intent requirement was added by
Representative Shellabarger after the original draft of section 2, which con-
tained no such requirement, 142 was criticized as overbroad.1 43  Section 1 of
the Act (which was codified as section 1983) was similarly criticized, 44 but
no comparable amendment was adopted. The rejected Sherman Amendment
also required that the rioters have acted "with intent to deprive any person
of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution." 145 If Congress had
wanted the existence of such an intent to be a prerequisite to liability under
section 1, it surely would have also so provided by express language.1 46
Monroe v. Pape rejected on this ground an attempt to read into section 1983
a requirement of "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." 147
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976) (codifying as amended, ch. 22, §2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)).
The 1870 Civil Rights Act made a similar distinction between civil and criminal liability.
Section 6 of that Act, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, forbade two or more citizens to conspire
to injure or oppress any citizen "with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and
enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States." No such requirement was contained in the civil provisions. See id. §§ 1,
3, 4, 16.
142. As originally drafted, § 2 applied to conspiracies "to do any act in violation of"
the constitutional rights of the victim. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1871) (re-
marks of Rep. Arthur).
143. Id. Shellabarger explained this amendment would require both "animus and effect."
Id. at 478 (emphasis in original). It was accepted the day after it was proposed. Id. at 513.
Apparently the new language was added at the particular insistence of Representative Willard,
who approved § 2 as so amended because it provided that "the essence of the crime should
consist in the intent to deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws and of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." Id. app., at 188. Representative Burchard also
emphasized the importance of this limitation on § 2. Id. app., at 315.
144. See, e.g., id. app., at 91-92 (remarks of Rep. Duke).
145. This language is in the draft recommended by the conference committee. CoNG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 755 (1871). The original version similarly required proof that
the "offense was committed to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the
Constitution." Id. at 663. The language finally adopted and now codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1986 (1976) provided liability for failing to stop any offense described in § 2, now 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, and thus incorporated § 2's intent requirement. In defending the committee draft
Sherman urged that it was consistent with the principle that "Etihe Government of the United
States ought not to undertake to suppress riots or disorderly or tumultuous assemblages
unless they aim at an authority conferred or a right secured by the Constitution of the
United States." Id. at 761.
146. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-26 (1968).
147. 365 U.S. at 187. A similar difference between the civil and penal provisions of the
Truth in Lending Act was relied upon in Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d
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In addition, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that, except as
to certain specific provisions, Congress attached no importance to the intent
involved. With regard to violations of the equal protection clause, which
were of particular concern, Representative Morton stressed "[i]f a State fails
to secure to a certain class of people the equal protection of the laws, it is
exactly equivalent to denying such protection. Whether that failure is
willful or the result of inability can make no difference, and is a question
into which it is not important that Congress should enter." 148 A majority
of Congress felt that the states violated the equal protection clause by
refusing to prosecute or otherwise remedy Ku Klux Klan outrages, but the
attitude of these states was described, not primarily as based on a desire to
violate that clause, but with terms such as "indifference," 149 "neglect," 150
or "undutiful." 151 Representative Arthur, who opposed the bill, asserted
without contradiction that "if the Legislature enacts a law [that violates the
Constitution] . . acting under a solemn, official oath, though as pure in duty
as a saint, as immaculate as a seraph, for a mere error of judgment, they are
liable." 152
With the exception of discrimination on the basis of race or sex,1 3
most constitutional violations do not involve an intent to violate the Constitu-
tion; the intended goal of the city or state is often laudatory, but the means
chosen is one which the Constitution forbids. Thus an intent requirement
could never be met in the case of violations of most provisions of the Con-
stitution;15 4 as to those provisions, reading an intent requirement into section
1983 would effectively nullify Monell.
A requirement that a city have knowingly disregarded a constitutional
command before it is liable under section 1983 faces similar difficulties. Screws
v. United States,155 a case involving section 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,150
makes this clear. The 1866 statute had been amended in 1909 to provide
that certain criminal violations must be "willful." 157 In Screws, the Supreme
Court construed this term to add a requirement that the defendant act "in
1161, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1974), to reject a suggestion that an error of law be made a defense
to a civil action under that statute.
148. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 251 (1871). See also id app., at 300
(remarks of Rep. Crichten).
149. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Beatty).
150. Id. at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar), 338 (remarks of Rep. Witthorne), 368 (remarks
of Rep. Sheldon), 448 (remarks of Rep. Butler), 574 (remarks of Sen. Stockton); id. app.,
at 72 (remarks of Rep. Blair), 153 (remarks of Rep. Garfield).
151. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 389 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Elliott).
152. Id. at 365. Similar assertions were made in 1866 regarding liability of judges under
the Civil Rights Act enacted in that year. See note 135 supra. But the proponents of the
1866 Act replied that judges faced no such liability if they acted in good faith. See CoN.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 1758 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
153. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976). Monell itself clearly in-
volves this form of intentional violation.
154. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 526 (1969).
155. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
156. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27.
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
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open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which
has been made specific and definite." 158 Screws expressly conceded that
both the term "willful," and any meaning it had added, were absent from
the statute as enacted in 1866. The willfulness requirement in Screws
appears similar if not identical to the executive immunity rule. 159 Such
immunity for some section 1983 defendants is entirely possible, but to afford
that immunity to cities, and thus to all possible defendants in a 1983 action,
would be to read into section 1983 the willfulness requirement which Congress
only added to civil rights legislation of that era in express terms and which
was limited to criminal prohibitions.
The proponents of the 1871 Act, moreover, were certainly aware that
their construction of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments was widely
disputed; their Democratic colleagues read both provisions in a narrow and
often nugatory manner. 60 Although the construction advanced by those
proponents has generally prevailed, Congress must have foreseen that, as
actually occurred, decades would pass before the issues of construction were
reached and definitely resolved by the Supreme Court. 6 ' In view of the
common-law immunities of officials, to have required that the city knew or
should have known it was acting in violation of "a clearly established con-
stitutional rule," would have been to preclude virtually any damage awards
under section 1983 in the lifetimes of its proponents.
2. The Remedial Purpose of Section 1983. The central purpose of
the 1871 Civil Rights Act was not to establish new substantive rights, but to
provide a remedy for violations of existing constitutional fights. Thus, the
measure was entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment .... ,, 162 Proponents of the Act repeatedly described it as pro-
158. 325 U.S. at 105.
The fact that the defendants may not have been thinking in constitutional terms is
not material where their aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen
of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution. When they so act they
at least act in reckless disregard of constitutional prohibitions or guarantees.
Id. at 106. It appears, moreover, that this limiting construction of "willful" was read into
§ 2 primarily because it was a criminal statute, and might otherwise have been unconstitu-
tionally vague. Id. at 101-05. That special requirement of specificity imposed on criminal
statutes does not apply to the civil provisions of § 1983.
159. See text accompanying notes 177-189 infra.
160. The most recurrent disagreement was about whether the fourteenth amendment
covered discrimination other than by statute. See notes 60-79 and accompanying text supra.
Only five years earlier the Democrats had argued it would be unfair to prosecute a judge who
refused to permit an ex-slave to testify or be a party, or imposed a greater penalty on an
ex-slave because of his race, if the judge believed that the thirteenth amendment allowed this
and that the 1866 Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 500 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan), 602 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks), 603-04 (re-
marks of Sen. Cowan), 1121 (remarks of Rep. Rogers), 1265 (remarks of Rep. Davis),
1680 (veto message of President Johnson), 1783 (remarks of Rep. Cowan).
161. For example, the question whether the fourteenth amendment applied to discrimina-
tion in the administration of a statute, as opposed to discrimination on the face of a statute,
was a major point of contention in Congress. See text accompanying notes 60-79 supra.
This issue was finally resolved in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). It has taken a
much longer period of time to resolve the issues raised by Representative Bingham's view
that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the entire Bill of Rights. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 83-85 (1871).
162. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis added).
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viding or correcting the lack of a "remedy" 163 or as a "redress for wrongs," 104
urging that it was "the duty of the national Government. .. to provide an
ultimate remedy for the redress of every wrong inflicted upon the citizen." Or
Representative Bingham, the author of the fourteenth amendment, explained
at length that that measure itself had been written and adopted to provide a
remedy for violations by the states of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.100
The members of the Forty-second Congress were certainly aware that
"[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an
invasion of personal interests in liberty," 167 and even opponents of section 1
recognized that damages were among the remedies provided.108 Congress
was prompted to take action because state and local authorities had failed
to provide the necessary civil and criminal remedies. That failure was not
the result of a general collapse of the administration of justice, but of a
selective refusal to provide redress against certain individuals, particularly
against members of the Ku Klux Klan and the public officials often acting
with them. 09 These congressional concerns militate strongly against any
construction of section 1983 which would leave unremedied any injury
suffered as a result of a constitutional violation. 70 The very existence of
personal immunity for government officials would seem to preclude granting
any immunity to the city itself, for the combined effects of the two immunities
would deny to an injured plaintiff any effective remedy.
3. The Deterrent Purpose of Section 1983. Section 1983 was intended
not only to redress, but also to prevent, constitutional violations. The pos-
sibility of monetary liability ordinarily "has the very desirable effect of deter-
ring [illegal] conduct" 171 and providing an "incentive to shun practices of
dubious legality." 172 There is substantial evidence that Congress intended
163. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Sheldon), 374, 376
(remarks of Rep. Lowe), 428 (remarks of Rep. Beatty), 482 (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
164. Id. at 597 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds), 429 (remarks of Rep. Beatty). See also id.
at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon).
165. Id. at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon).
166. Id. app., at 85; see text accompanying notes 246-50 infra.
167. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971). See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-57 (1978).
168. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 216 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
169. "Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the
worst of felons could devise,, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime,
and the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective
redress." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe) (emphasis
added). See also id. at 666 (remarks of Rep. Spencer) ("[]ong immunity from punishment"
has emboldened the Klan) (emphasis added), 319 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton) (urging "no
future exemption from punishment for crimes against the peace and safety of the nation").
170. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court noted, "The purpose of § 1983
would be defeated if injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights went un-
compensated simply because the common law does not recognize an analogous cause of
action." Id. at 258. Those purposes would be equally frustrated if the immunity afforded to
city officials were combined with an immunity for the city itself so as to protect every wrong-
doer involved in the constitutional violation.
171. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, I., concurring injudgment).
172. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975). See also Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-56 (1978).
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the 1871 Civil Rights Act to have just such an impact. Representative Bing-
ham argued that deterrence was a legitimate purpose of the legislation: "Are
not laws preventive, as well as remedial and punitive? Is it not better to
prevent a great transgression in advance, than to engage in the terrible work
of imprisonment, and confiscation, and execution after the crime has been
done?" 173 Representative Dunnell also predicted the bill would have a
deterrent effect:
The ex-rebels have once felt the power of the Government. Let
them again be assured that it will protect the citizen and- make
secure the rights which belong to him, protect him in his life,
liberty, and property, and they will at least be less bold in their
career of blood.174
Any construction of section 1983 which significantly reduces the likelihood
that a city will be held responsible in damages for municipal policies 175 will
tend to frustrate this purpose of section 1983.176
B. Executive Immunity
Reading into section 1983 the form of immunity enjoyed at common
law by executive officials, the Supreme Court has held that such officials
cannot be held liable in a section 1983 action unless they acted "in a way
that is known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner
that they should know transgresses a clearly established constitutional
rule." 177 Whether a public employer should also be immune under those
circumstances seems certain to be a major issue in the wake of Monell.
The very nature and contours of the executive immunity doctrine would,
if extended to local governments, be incompatible with Monell. In Scheuer
v. Rhodes 17 8 the Court explained that "in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of
the office." 17 "[Miigher officers of the executive branch" enjoy greater im-
munity because "the range of decisions and choices-whether the formula-
tion of policy, of legislation, of budgets, or of day-to-day decisions-is
173. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 85 (1871).
174. Id. app., at 262. See also CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 665-66 (1871)(remarks of Rep. Spencer); id. app., at 101 (remarks of Rep. Pool) (bill will have a "repressing
effect"), 182 (remarks of Rep. Mercur) (desperadoes will "modify their conduct"), 202
(remarks of Rep. Snyder) (enactment will bring "repose"), 312 (remarks'of Rep. Burchard)
(supports any measure that will "restore peace and order").
175. This is, of course, different from providing such an incentive to a city to control
the policies and conduct of unrelated third parties, an approach Congress apparently rejected.
See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 690-93.
176. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978).
177. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). Although the 'Butz Court was dis-
cussing the immunity enjoyed by federal executive officials sued for constitutional violations,
it expressly stated that it was adopting the immunity doctrine applicable to state executive
officials sued under § 1983. Id. at 506-08.
178. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
179. Id. at 247.
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virtually infinite." 180 But while Scheuer seeks to afford greater immunity to
the extent that the defendant is a high policymaking official, that is precisely
the circumstance in which Monell would impose liability on the city. The
exercise of discretion which Scheuer requires as a basis of individual im-
munity is among the prerequisites of municipal liability under Monell. Thus,
extending the Scheuer immunity to cities could result in a rule that any
violation that was a policy under Monell would be immune under Scheuer;
even a more sensible reading would raise, as to any case, serious questions as
to whether one of the two requirements was not met. Certainly Congress
cannot have intended that litigants frame their complaints and proof with
the extraordinary precision necessary to fall between the Scylla of Scheuer
and the Charybdis of Monell.
In establishing the executive immunity doctrine, the Court expressed
concern over the impact of possible damage awards upon discretionary
decisions of state and municipal officials. In Wood v. Strickland,""' the
Court stated that the absence of immunity "would unfairly impose upon
the . . . decisionmaker the burden of mistakes made in good faith in the
course of exercising his discretion within the scope of his official duties." 182
Because a public employee receives no personal gains from a particular
deision, personal liability for good faith errors would ordinarily have a
decisively chilling effect, and would thus deter an official from acting deci-
sively to serve the public interest. 83 The circumstances presented by an
action against a public employer are quite different, for the interests of the
city or county are advanced by particular policy decisions. The actions of
public employees are thus unlikely to be influenced by the mere possibility
of municipal liability, but only by a liability disproportionate in likelihood
and amount to the public interests at stake in the decision.' 84
Other purposes served by the executive immunity doctrine are also
inapplicable to suits against government entities themselves. Such immunity
protects public officials from having to choose at their peril between dis-
regarding the "legal obligations" of their position and being sued for damages
for violating the Constitution, 85 but this consideration is manifestly irrelevant
where the potential defendant is the very city which established those legal
obligations. Similarly, the possibility of municipal rather than personal
180. Id. at 246. In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), four members of the Court
went so far as to urge that cabinet level officials should enjoy absolute immunity. Id. at
517-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A majority of the Court, however, rejected this view.
181. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
182. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
183. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
184. See text accompanying notes 199-200 infra. To be sure, the mere possibility of a
large judgment against municipal funds might influence the actions of an official who is ul-
timately responsible for a city's finances, such as a mayor or treasurer. However, the alternate
municipal defense proposed below, see text accompanying notes 211-16 infra, which focuses
upon, inter alia, the likelihood that a planned action will be held unconstitutional and the
importance of the goal at which the action is directed, is adequate to protect the city's inter-
ests in such a situation.
185. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
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liability obviously will not deter capable candidates from seeking public
office.' 86
Extending executive immunity to public employers would also defeat
one of the purposes of the absolute immunity afforded to legislators. In
Tenney v. Brandhove187 the Court noted that absolute legislative immunity
is intended to protect individual legislators from the "inconvenience and
distractions of a trial... as to [their] motives." 188  If an executive immunity
defense were available in an action against a city grounded in an unconstitu-
tional ordinance, the plaintiff would be obligated, and thus authorized, to
put on trial both the members and the motives of the city council or other
legislative body. Increased intrusions into the motivations of both city
prosecutors and city judges might also be required.189  Thus creating for
cities a new form of immunity, similar to that of executive officials but
unknown at common law, would inevitably derogate the common-law im-
munities of legislators, judges, and prosecutors.
Rejection of executive immunity for cities is thus consistent with the
nature and purposes of that doctrine, as well as with the language and
purposes of section 1983. Rejection of good faith immunity for cities does
not, however, mean that their financial interests will be wholly disregarded
in section 1983 litigation. The following subsection suggests that settled
principles of tort law are easily applicable to section 1983 actions against
cities, and that these principles are adequate to safeguard legitimate municipal
interests.
C. The Tort Defense
1 1. The Proposed Standard. Although "§ 1983 is to be read in har-
mony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses," 190 there was
no nineteenth-century principle of partial municipal immunity that could be
imported into section 1983, and the legislative history and purpose of the 1871
Act do not support the creation of such immunity. There was and is, how-
ever, a relevant tort defense. Tort law does not ordinarily require a defendant
to pay for every injury which may be catused by his or her conduct, but only
for those injuries that are the result of negligence or of an intent to do harm.
Although the standard of conduct of the law of negligence is often articulated
merely in terms of what a reasonable person would do, the standard in fact
186. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
187. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
188. Id. at 377.
189. Ordinarily, of course, the knowledge and motives of city legislators would be irrele-
vant to the constitutionality of an ordinance, except where the claim is that the statute was
framed to discriminate against a racial or other group. Establishing the knowledge and motives
on the part of legislators raises difficult and delicate problems. See Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977). Such "judicial inquiries
into legislative or executive motivation represents a substantial intrusion into the workings of
other branches of government." Id. n.18. There is no reason to believe that the Forty-second
Congress intended to mandate such an intrusion in order to increase the possibility that a
city could avoid paying damages for a violation of the Constitution.
190. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
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involves weighing four distinct considerations: (a) the likelihood that the
conduct would cause injury, (b) the magnitude of the possible injury, (c) the
importance of the goal at which the conduct is directed, and (d) the avail-
ability of alternative methods of achieving that goal. 19'
These standards can readily be applied to a section 1983 action against
cities subject to but one change. Since the harm with which that action is
concerned is a constitutional one, it is apparent that the first standard ought
to be altered to "the likelihood that the conduct will cause a constitutional
injury," a standard that encompasses consideration of the likelihood that the
conduct will be held unconstitutional as well as the probability that it will
result in damage.
The application to section 1983 litigation of such an adaptation of the
usual tort standard of negligence is supported not only by the invocation of
tort standards in Carey v. Piphus, 92 and the statement in Monell that the
gravamen of the action is a "constitutional tort," 193 but also by the repeated
references to tort analogies during the debates of 1871.104 Monell recog-
nized that Congress .enacted section 1983 because state officials "were
deliberately indifferent to the rights of black citizens"; 195 it seems reasonable
to assume that Congress was as concerned with indifference to the possibility
that a policy would be held unconstitutional as it was with indifference to
the possibility that a policy would bring about a state of affairs whose uncon-
stitutionality was already clearly established. And Monroe emphasized, in
rejecting a willfulness requirement, that section 1983 "should be read against
the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions." 190
Application of this modified tort standard resolves the practical prob-
lems raised by Monell in a sensible way. For example, under this standard,
liability would not be imposed retroactively when an established constitu-
tional precedent is overturned by the Supreme Court, since prior to the
decision involved there would have been little foreseeable risk of constitu-
tional injury. In other cases a court will be able to consider not merely the
degree to which the unconstitutionality of conduct could have been fore-
seen,197 but other sensibly relevant facts. A given degree of risk may be
191. See W. PROSSER, supra note 116, § 31, at 145-49.
192. 435 U.S. 247, 254-55, 257-59 (1978).
193. 436 U.S. at 691. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
194. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 752 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger), 804
(remarks of Rep. Poland), 805 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
195. 436 U.S. at 68 n.45.
196. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
197. The likelihood that a practice will be found unconstitutional cannot be calculated
with any great precision. It will generally be difficult to do more than place a practice into
rough categories: (a) practices which are unconstitutional under established law or would be
absent some new exception, see, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977);
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); (b) practices as to whose constitutionality reasonable
attorneys would differ; (c) practices which cannot be held unconstitutional unless existing law
is overturned, see, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); and (d) previously un-
challenged practices whose constitutionality raises novel issues, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
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insufficient to impose liability where the injury was minor and the disputed
conduct was the only way to protect an important city interest, but may
warrant an award of damages where the city could have foreseen that the
conduct would cause serious harm 198 and had alternative methods to protect
its interests. More importantly, this standard provides an incentive to the
city, in areas where the law may be unclear, "to self-examine and to self-
evaluate" 199 its practices, to choose methods with a lower risk of constitu-
tional infirmity, and to reconsider the importance of goals whose achievement
will necessarily involve such risks. Under the executive immunity rule, a
city which knew that the constitutionality of its practices was in serious doubt
would be free to cavalierly continue those practices, despite whatever serious
harm they might be causing, until the Supreme Court finally heard and
decided a case resolving the constitutional issue involved. The tort standard
permits a court to distinguish. such a city from one seeking in good faith to
achieve its goals with a minimum risk of constitutional infraction.
The use of this standard to define the scope of a city's defense will
mean that in some cases the city will face liability under federal law even
though the responsible official does not. That, however, is not inappropriate.
Officials may reasonably be afforded greater immunity for two reasons.
First, the amount of potential financial liability will often be immense com-
pared to the personal resources of the official, especially a high official who
sets policies affecting large numbers of people. Personal risks of that mag-
nitude can have a catastrophically chilling effect on an individual; even a
small risk of a $100,000 judgment will be sufficient to deter an exercise of
entirely proper discretion. A city, on the other hand, can afford to run
such risks, and in fact does so on a daily basis in the management of munici-
pal affairs. Second, once such a risk appears, an individual official has no
personal interest in bearing it, unless of course he or she is faced with a
Hobson's choice between personal liability and dismissal. An official will
not run the risk of a $10,000 judgment against him or her even if the policy
involved could save the city $100,000,000. But the city itself is presumably
receiving some substantial benefit from the policy at issue, and can there-
fore weigh the importance of that benefit against the risks involved. Thus,
the same financial risks which might well deter an official from taking neces-
113 (1973). Practices of the first sort will ordinarily meet the tort standard, and those of the
third ordinarily will not. As to practices in the second category, the other tort factors will
usually be controlling. Practices in the fourth category might be treated as in the third until
the city is sued or otherwise put on notice as to the existence of a constitutional challenge,
and thereafter as in the second category.
198. In Moore v. City of B. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the city sought to enforce
a city ordinance which literally prohibited individuals not members of a single family from
living in the same house. Although the provision was apparently intended to deal with com-
munal living arrangements involving unrelated adults, it was successfully challenged as applied
to two minor first cousins. While the outcome of the case might have been difficult to predict,
the interest of the city in immediate enforcement was trivial, especially since such, family
groupings were doubtless rare. In addition, enforcement of the ordinance would have broken
up a family unit as well as causing additional living expenses. Had the city actually succeeded
in doing so, an award of damages would have been entirely appropriate.
199. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
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sary and proper steps will have a far more modest effect on the city itself,
forcing it only to consider constitutional values along with the other interests
with which it is concerned. 200 This greater degree of protection for officials
than for government bodies is consistent with modern civil rights legislation;
in applying the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, for example,
the Supreme Court noted with approval that while the Act imposed liability
for counsel fees even absent bad faith it authorized such awards against the
city or state rather than the individual officials involved.201
2. Applying the Standard: Governmental Litigation. The operation
of the suggested standard may be illustrated by considering a common
form of governmental action-the conduct of criminal and civil litigation.
For reasons similar to those recited in Pierson v. Ray 202 and Imbler v.
Pachtman,203 no damage action existed at common law for injury suffered
as a result of good faith litigation. But unlike'the immunity afforded judges
and prosecutors, the common-law protection for ordinary litigants was limited
to those who acted in good faith. Litigants who acted in bad faith could
be sued for malicious prosecution or, more recently, abuse of civil process. 2 4
Even in the course of bona fide litigation, obdurate or bad faith conduct
could give rise to a judgment of civil contempt. Similar liability for im-
properly motivated civil or criminal litigation or tactics seems appropriate
against a city, even though it is not available against the officials involved.
Of course in many cases those abuses will not involve an official policy or
custom, but only an errant individual, and thus no cause of action would
exist under Monell. But if, for example, a mayor were to direct the com-
mencement of a suit for unconstitutional purposes, or a district attorney
were personally involved in the destruction of exculpatory evidence, an
award of damages against the governmental entity involved would be
appropriate.
Special considerations apply to government activity outside of, but re-
lated to, litigation. Frequently the government will need to take or refrain
from certain actions in order to generate or maintain its right to litigate at
all. Thus a city cannot test the validity of an ordinance without enacting
it, and in some cases bringing a civil or criminal action. To impose liability
for the injury incident to these steps would be to obstruct access of the
government to the courts, and to deter good faith efforts to ascertain the
constitutional authority of the government itself. The legislative history of
section 1983, however, reveals not hostility toward government efforts to
200. The lower courts have generally recognized the differing impact of such awards.
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 560 F.2d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated anid
remanded, 438 U.S. 902 (1978); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977); Hander
v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Note, Damage
Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HAtv. L. Rnv. 922, 957
(1976).
201. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699 n.32 (1978).
202. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
203. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
204. W. PROSSER, supra note 116, § 119, at 834-85.
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litigate constitutional theories, but an affirmative desire to open the courts
for the resolution of constitutional disputes.205 The process of government
is of greater public importance than ordinary private conduct, and while it
may be appropriate in some cases to deter the government from taking ac-
tions of dubious constitutionality, it is not appropriate to deter the govern-
ment from seeking in good faith to remove that constitutional cloud.206
Accordingly, liability should not be imposed on a city for taking in good
faith the steps minimally necessary to test the constitutionality of a desired
policy or action.207
This consideration will ordinarily dispose of claims of a person who is
denied, or could not meet, bail between his criminal conviction and the
date when he is released because of a successful constitutional challenge to
that conviction. A constitutional claim is asserted in a substantial portion
of all criminal appeals, and the state has a substantial interest in obtaining
incarceration pending appeal. Such incarceration is necessary to assure
that the imposition of sanctions is swift as well as certain, and a convicted
criminal is far more likely to flee the jurisdiction than one merely awaiting
trial. The state could not effectively test its constitutional authority to in-
carcerate an individual if he had fled pending appeal, nor test its constitu-
tional authority to incarcerate him promptly if bail on appeal was required
in all cases. Moreover, where a conviction is overturned but a new trial
permitted in light of the constitutional claim, a possible damage claim for
the period of incarceration during the appeal would raise additional prob-
lems. The prosecutor would be deterred from dropping the charges, and a
new and inappropriate element would enter into plea bargaining negotiations.
Even if the defendant were retried and acquitted, in many cases it would
205. See text accompanying notes 251-60 infra.
206. The nature of this limitation is illustrated by United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1 (1977). There the legislatures of New Jersey and New York enacted legislation
which effectively modified the terms of bonds issued by the Port Authority by permitting it
to spend its funds for mass transportation. The Governor of New York, while expressing
serious reservations as to the validity of the legislation, signed it so that the matter could be
resolved in the courts. Id. at 14 n.12. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the legisla-
tion violated the contract clause. Id. at 17-32. The mere act of passing the legislation ap-
pears to have had some impact on the value of the bonds, id. at 19, but this was a necessary
incident of the states' desire to .test their authority to adopt the legislation, and an award of
damages to a bondholder who sold at this lower price would have been inappropriate. If,
however, the Port Authority had proceeded during the litigation to spend funds unlawfully,
thus permanently lowering the value of the bonds, some compensatory remedy might well have
been proper. A somewhat different situation might have existed if the immediate expenditure
of funds, e.g., to prevent the deterioration of a roadway, had been essential to the mass trans-
portation project. Thus in Linmark Assocs. v. Town of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), a
two year delay in implementing the limitation on for sale signs which encouraged panic selling
might well have totally defeated the purpose of the ordinance.
207. Several limitations inherent in this formulation are essential to avoid abuse of this
rule. First, the city must establish that the actual purpose of those steps was in fact to create
the case or controversy necessary for litigation, a requirement that will invariably necessitate
a showing that the action was taken on the advice of counsel. Second, the protection must
be strictly limited to those steps actually necessary to bring about an adjudication of the city's
authority. In many circumstances a simple action for declaratory relief will be sufficient to
achieve this purpose, and no substantive measures whatever will be necessary. Finally, the
city must take all reasonable steps to bring about a prompt judicial resolution of the contro-
versy it has deliberately precipitated.
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be difficult to say, in light of the passage of time and other differences be-
tween the two trials, whether the first conviction, and thus the incarceration,
was caused by the constitutional violation. Thus, as a general matter, in-
carceration pending appeal is ordinarily among those measures minimally
necessary for a city or state to litigate its contention that a defendant was
properly convicted.
A different situation arises, however, where a defendant contends that
he cannot constitutionally be prosecuted for his actual or alleged conduct.
These cases, of course, occur relatively infrequently; most involve claims
that the conduct involved was constitutionally protected, but double jeopardy
claims would also be included. Unlike a procedural or evidentiary viola-
tion, where the purpose of the relevant constitutional provision is merely to
control investigatory or trial conduct, in these cases the purpose of the
constitutional provision is to prevent the incarceration of the defendant.208
In many instances, such as prosecutions alleged to violate the first amend-
ment, incarceration pending appeal will aggravate the constitutional viola-
tion by chilling protected conduct by others, and the risk of flight will often
be minimal. For these reasons the bad faith prerequisite to damages for
incarceration should not apply to incarceration for conduct ultimately held
to be constitutionally .protected or to have been the subject of a previous
prosecution; in such cases the general tort standard described above should
apply. In the case of constitutionally protected conduct the official policy
requirement of Monelt will almost always be met by the adoption of the
statute or ordinance involved. In double jeopardy cases the prosecutor will
ordinarily be exercising delegated authority, thus subjecting the govern-
mental unit to liability,209 but it may be possible to prove the contrary.
3. Three Exceptions. In most cases, the standard suggested here will
represent the best accommodation of the interests of both municipal defend-
ants and injured plaintiffs in section 1983 actions. There are some circum-
stances, however, where it would not do so, and where those interests would
be better served by different standards. First, the tort standard defense
should not be available to the extent that the monetary relief sought would
leave the city or state no worse off financially than if the violation had never
occurred. This will include cases where the government has taken or with-
held funds from the plaintiff; such an action is more analogous to replevin
than to tort.210 In such a case the city should be held strictly liable regard-
less of the usual considerations regarding "due care" for damages up to the
amount of its gain from the constitutional violation. In VIandis v. Kline,211
for example, the Court affirmed a district court order directing the refund of
excess tuition charges which had been collected in violation of the due
208. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-95 (1976).
209. See text accompanying notes 22-40 supra.
210. See, e.g., Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976), iacated
and remanded, 438 U.S. 901 (1978); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976). See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
211. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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process clause. 212  The same principle would apply to the extent that the
violation had produced a net profit for the government, albeit from another
source. Clearly a city or state will not be seriously deterred from taking
any possibly legitimate action if it knows that, at worst, a section 1983 action
may deprive it of all ill-gotten gains, and such liability obviously poses no
threat to the fiscal integrity of a government.
The second exception is suggested by Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.213  In most cases a constitutional violation will occur
in the performance of ordinary governmental functions. But in light of
Bakke 2 14 it is possible that a good faith effort to remedy a constitutional
violation may itself be a constitutional violation. Thus a governmental em-
ployer with a history of actual or arguable employment discrimination
against blacks may have a right or duty, possibly of different scope, .to im-
plement a race-conscious hiring or promotion policy as a remedy, but, if it
adopts such a policy in the wrong form, or in the wrong manner, the govern-
ment may violate the constitutional rights of whites. The elaboration of the
constitutional limitations on affirmative action promises to be a lengthy and
complex process, and one best implemented solely by prospective injunctive
relief. Similar problems might be posed by a state shield law, intended to
protect the first amendment interests in preserving the confidentiality of a
reporter's sources; such a statute might be claimed to violate a criminal
defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. In enacting section
1983, Congress cannot be presumed to have intended to authorize awards
of damages for good faith efforts to comply with or implement the Con-
stitution, since the possibility of such suits would deter the voluntary actions
which section 1983 was intended to encourage. 215
Finally, as is set out in detail above, it is possible for a given action or
practice to be an official policy within the meaning of Monell even though
nominally forbidden by an unenforced prophylactic rule. This might occur,
for example, where a city has a nominal rule prohibiting firing non-policy-
making officials on the basis of political affiliation, but such practices are in
fact widespread and well known. A violation of even nominal city or state
law is not among the exercises of discretion which are to be left unencum-
bered by section 1983, whether the defendant is an individual official or the
government itself. 216  Thus either defendant should be held liable for in-
juries occasioned by unconstitutional conduct which clearly violates state or
local law, even if it occurred before such conduct had been declared a con-
stitutional violation.
212. Id. at 445.
213. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
214. See particularly Justice Powell's somewhat surprising conclusion that even where
adoption of a race-conscious program is required to remedy a constitutional violation, volun-
tary adoption of that required remedy may itself be a constitutional violation if not preceded
by an appropriate judicial decision. Id. at 307-10.
215. See text accompanying notes 171-74 supra. See also Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,
326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
216. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974) (executive immunity enables pub-
lic employees to "fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices").
1979]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
11. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS
Each of the opinions in Monell studiously avoids discussing whether
states, like cities and counties, are "persons" within the meaning of section
1983. Edelman v. Jordan 2 1 7 had earlier held that states could not be sued
under section 1983, but this holding was based on the premise, established
in Monroe but overturned by Monel, that no government units were "per-
sons." 218 The availability of states as defendants in section 1983 actions
was inconclusively debated by several members of the Court in Hutto v.
Finney 219 a few weeks after Monell, and was the subject of a somewhat
opaque per curiam decision in Alabama v. Pugh220 decided ten days after
Hutto. The question of whether a state is a "person"e was finally resolved
in the 1978 Term in Quern v. Jordan,221 which held that there was insuffici-
ent evidence that the Forty-second Congress had intended to abrogate the
immunity of states from suit in federal court2 22 and that the term "person"
should thus not be construed to include a state.
Although Quern reaffirms the established bar to section 1983 actions
against states as such, it is ,also a watershed in the development of injunctive
remedies available against state officials. This section discusses the expanded
scope of injunctive relief now available in section 1983 actions, and shows
that it is consistent with the purposes expressed by Congress.
1. The Cases. To understand the change in the law reflected in
Quern, it is necessary to compare it with the far narrower rule announced at
the turn 6f the century in Ex parte Young.223 In Ex parte Young the plain-
tiff had sought a federal injunction forbidding the Attorney General of Min-
nesota from taking any steps to enforce certain state-imposed railroad rates.
217. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
218. Id. at 672-73. See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976).
219. 437 U.S. 678, 703 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 704 (Powell, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
220. 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
221. 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979).
222. The source of this immunity is a subject of continuing confusion. Some opinions
suggest that it is found in the eleventh amendment, see, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 99 S.Ct. 1139,
1144-45 (1979), while others recognize that the amendment "by its terms does not bar suits
against a State by its own citizens." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974); Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). The possibility that suits against states were outside thejudicial power under article III as originally drafted was unanimously rejected by the Supreme
Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 302-29, 378-92 (1821), but it com-
manded two and perhaps as many as eight votes in Employees of the Dep't of Pub.
Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 290-98 (1973).
More recent decisions have ignored this theory, however. E.g., Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct.
1139 (1979); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974). A third possibility, that sovereign immunity, like the common-law immunity
of judges and legislators, is simply presumed to be preserved by federal legislation
absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, is suggested by Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184 (1964), and passages in Quern, 99 S. Ct. at 1145. Although this third doctrine
appears the most sensible and historically sound, the discussion which follows refers to the
eleventh amendment, since that is the approach taken by the majority in Quern. Whether the
eleventh amendment was repealed pro tanto by the fourteenth remains unresolved. See Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 n.23 (1977); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908).
223. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
[Vol. 79:213
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
The Attorney General claimed that an action seeking to restrain a state
official in the performance of his or her official duties was in effect an action
against the state itself, and thus outside the jurisdiction of a federal court.
In rejecting this contention the Supreme Court insisted that a state official
who sought to act in violation of the Constitution could enjoy no valid
state authority to do so, and that an injunction against such conduct was
therefore in no sense an injunction against the state. 224
In the Court's view this doctrine was necessarily subject to two im-
portant limitations. First, the defendant official must be in some way re-
sponsible for the violation at issue; otherwise the plaintiff would be "merely
making him a party as a representative of the state, and thereby attempting
to make the state a party." 225 Second, the relief available against a state
official was limited to either a prohibition against unconstitutional conduct
or a direction that the official perform some act "merely ministerial in
nature" "not involving discretion"; "no affirmative action of any nature"
could be required. 226 Both of these restrictions were closely related to the
legal fiction underlying Ex parte Young. Simply prohibiting an official from
violating the Constitution might fairly be described as interfering with no
valid state authority, but the same could not be said of an order requiring
that official to use his official powers to redress some resulting injury. And
even though one official had violated the Constitution, and had in that re-
spect acted beyond his or her authority, the fiction of Ex parte Young was
manifestly insufficient to support the granting of any injunctive relief against
another official who had not done so.
Notwithstanding the importance of these limitations to the rationale of
Ex parte Young, it is clear that they are no longer adhered to by the Supreme
Court. Quern v. Jordan,227 for example, arose in 1971 because the Director
of the Illinois Department of Public Aid had been guilty of excessive delays
in the processing of certain social security claims, in violation of the Social
Security Act and the federal regulations thereunder. But the particular
Director responsible for that violation was Edward Weaver, who was still in
office when the violation ceased in 1972 at the direction of the district court.
After the violation had ended, Weaver was succeeded by Joel Edelman, who
was replaced by James Trainor, who in turn was replaced in 1978 by Arthur
Quem. In 1979 the Supreme Court unanimously upheld an injunction
against Quern, even though he was not responsible in any way for the under-
lying violation, and had not taken office until seven years after the violation
occurred. This aspect of the Quern order, though a particularly striking
departure from the Ex parte Young standard, was illustrative of the general
practice of the Court declining to inquire into whether the state official
224. Id. at 159-60.
225. Id. at 157.
226. Id. at 158-59.
227. 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979).
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against whom an order is to run is the same person as the official responsible
for the original violation. 228
Similarly, the injunctions available against state officials are no longer
limited to those which prevent violations of the Constitution or federal law.
In Quern the disputed order directed the state official to notify certain past
social security applicants of their right to appeal the denial of benefits that
had resulted from the illegal delays. The officials questioned whether this
amounted to a money judgment,229 but the Supreme Court held it did not,
since there was no certainty that benefits would result from the issuance of
the notice. But no one questioned the authority of the district court to
issue an injunction whose sole purpose was to bring about compensation for
a monetary injury sustained several years before. The order upheld in
Quern was thus outside the scope sanctioned by Ex parte Young in two
respects. Not only was it affirmative rather than merely prohibitory in
nature, but it sought, not to end a violation of federal law, but to remedy
injuries sustained as the result of a violation long past.
The compensatory nature of the order in Quern represents the most
radical departure from Ex parte Young, and reflects a relatively recent
change in the articulated standard, though not necessarily the practice, of
the Court. In 1975 the Supreme Court emphasized in Edelman v. Jordan
that Ex parte Young had only directed "the Attorney General of Minnesota
.... to conform his future conduct of that office to the requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 230 Equitable restitution of unlawfully withheld
benefits was said to be outside the scope of Ex parte Young because it was
sought
not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with
a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of com-
"pensation to those whose applications were processed on the slower
time schedule at a time when petitioner was under no court-
imposed obligation to conform to a different standard.. . . It is
measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach
of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials.2 '
But three years later in Milliken I 1232 the Court upheld a decree against
state officials directing them to redress the harm caused by past school
segregation by providing the victims with remedial education. Milliken II
228. There was a time when this limitation in Ex parte Young was manipulated to avoid
compliance with the Constitution. Prior to 1960, when southern voting registrars were sued
for racially discriminatory practices they frequently resigned their positions. Their successors
then argued, frequently with success, that the actions of their predecessors was no basis for
an action or injunction against them. Congress put an end to this abuse in 1960 by permitting
the state itself to be named as a defendant in certain voting cases. See United States v.
Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960).
229. This argument had previously been accepted by the Third Circuit. See Fanty v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 551 F.2d 2 (3d Cir. 1977).
230. 415 U.S. at 664.
231. Id. at 668.
232. Miliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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expressly held that the injunctive relief to which the victims were entitled
included redressing past violations as well as preventing future ones. Re-
iterating the standard applied in earlier actions against local government
officials, the Court explained that federal court decrees might properly be
aimed at any condition that "violate[s] the Constitution or. . . flow[s] from
such a violation." 233
[B]y the nature of the antecedent violation . . . the victims of
Detroit's de jure segregated system will continue to experience the
effects of segregation until such future time as the remedial pro-
grams can help dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct.
.. . That the programs are also "compensatory" in nature does
not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates pro-
spectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school
system. We therefore hold that such prospective relief is not barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. 234
Thus the requirement that a decree be prospective, which in Edelman re-
ferred to whether the decree was aimed at violations occurring after the
decree, in Milliken II meant only that the mandated compliance activities
were to occur after the entry of the decree.
The doctrine of Ex parte Young is thus inadequate to explain the com-
pensatory injunctions the Supreme Court is now upholding or to provide
significant guidance for the lower courts in framing injunctions against state
officials. Other developments since Ex parte Young, however, offer a solu-
tion to this difficulty. In deciding Ex parte Young the Court regarded
itself as presented with a question purely constitutional in nature-what
form of injunctive relief is permitted against state officials under the eleventh
amendment. If that were still the sole issue it would be necessary to devise
a new construction of the amendment that would rationalize the distinc-
tions emerging in Quern and Milliken II. But Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,2 35 de-
cided between Edelman and Milliken II, held that Congress, acting under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, could lift the eleventh amendment
immunity of the states. Thus, whether a particular type of injunction may
be issued against a state official in a section 1983 action involves the con-
struction of the statute as well as, or perhaps rather than, the eleventh
amendment.
Quern, of course, resolves two issues of statutory construction, holding
that section 1983 does not authorize suits against states in their own name
or injunctions, such as that in Edelman, directing state officials to pay dam-
ages to private plaintiffs out of state funds. But while Quern considers the
legislative history of the statute with regard to such suits or injunctions, it
does not purport to decide what other forms of injunctive relief Congress
233. Id. at 282.
234. Id. at 290.
235. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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might have intended to authorize against state officials. More fundamentally,
Quern does not purport to read the 1871 Civil Rights Act as generally in-
corporating the then existing eleventh amendment case law. This is not
surprising, since there was little such case law at the time, and what there
was indicated that any relief whatever was possible against a state official
so long as he or she was sued in his or her own name.236 Thus the avail-
ability of forms of injunctive relief other than the sort of "equitable restitu-
tion" rejected in Quern and Edelman remains a question to be resolved in
the light of the purposes and legislative history of section 1983 as well as
those of the eleventh amendment.
2. The Legislative History of Section 1983. Providing a remedy for
constitutional violations by state officials was a primary purpose of section
1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. The measure was entitled an act to "en-
force" the fourteenth amendment, 237 and the specified defendants were per-'
sons acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State." 238 Senator Edmunds, the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the leading proponent of the bill, said of the Act:
The first section is one that I believ6 nobody objects to, as
defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States
when they are assailed by any State law or under color of any state
law, and it is merely carrying out the principles of the [1866] civil
rights bill, which have since become part of the Constitution. 2 9
Representative Shellabarger, the House sponsor and Chairman of the House
Select Committee that drafted the bill, said that section 1 was "in its terms
carefully confined to giving a civil action for such wrongs against citizenship
as are done under color of State laws which abridge these rights." 240
236. This rule was adhered to in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 857 (1824), and Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1872). Between Osborn
and Davis the Court held that an action naming only "The Governor of Georgia" by title, but
not by name, was an action against the state, Governor of Ga. v. Sundry African Slaves,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123 (1828), because the governor was sued "not by his name, but by
his style of office." This decision, however, was not extended to suits against officials in their
own names for half a century. The possibility of evading the eleventh amendment by suing
state officials in their own names was first questioned in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 712
(1882). Justices Field and Harlan dissented, relying heavily on Osborn and Davis. Id. at
728-69. Earlier the same Term, in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207-08 (1882), the
Court apparently still adhered to the nominal party rule. The headnotes of United States v.
Lee, reportedly written by Justice Miller, clearly follow that rule. See C. JAcoBs, Tim
ELEVENTH AmENDMENT AND SovEREiaN IMMuNrrY 191-92 (1972). The rule of Osborn and
Davis was not openly rejected until In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887). The Court there
expressly noted that the new rule was established by "recent decisions" and was "not in
harmony" with Osborn and Davis. Id. at 487. Although Osborn and Davis are no longer
good law, they represented "'the reigning constitutional theory of [the] day' when the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was debated and enacted." See Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. at 1146 n.14
(quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 676 (1978)).
237. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added).
239. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (1871).
240. Id. app., at 68.
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Section 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 41 after which section 1983 was
modeled, 242 was itself intended to "furnish redress against State laws and
proceedings" 243 and to protect certain basic rights from "governmental
interference." 244
MonelI relied on certain remarks of Representative Bingham as dem-
onstrating the intent of Congress to provide a remedy for constitutional
violations by cities.24 5 In fact, the remarks referred to by the Court place
far greater emphasis on the need to remedy state misconduct. Bingham, as
Monell noted, explained that section 1 of the fourteenth amendment was
drafted because under Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,24 6 a "city [could take]
private property for public use, without compensation . . . and there was
no redress for the wrong." 247 But Bingham continued: "before the ratifica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, the State could deny to any citizen the
right of trial by jury, and it was done. Before that the State could abridge
the freedom of the press, and it was so done in* half of the States of the
Union." 248
Monell reads Binigham's further remarks as "clearly indicat[ing] his
view that such takings by cities, as had occurred in Barron, would be re-
dressable under § 1 of the bill." 249 But the passage apparently referred to
is again concerned with remedying violations by states:
Why not in advance provide against the denial of rights by
States ... .? As I have already said, the States did deny to citizens
the equal protection of the laws, they did deny the rights of citizens
under the Constitution, and except to the extent of the express
limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the citizen had no
remedy. They denied trial by jury, and he had no remedy. They
took property without compensation, and he had no remedy. They
restricted the freedom of the press, and he had no remedy. They
restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no remedy.
[T]he negative, limitations imposed by the Constitution on
States can be enforced by law against individuals and States .... 210
241. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
242. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 68 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Shelabarger).
243. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16 (1883).
244. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 424-26 & n.33 (1968).
245. See, e.g., 436 U.S. at 685 n.45.
246. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
247. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 84 (1871).
248. Id. The violations of free speech were of particular concern to Bingham and the
other Republicans, since the victims were frequently northern abolitionists speaking in southern
states. See CoNo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Hoar).
249. 436 U.S. at 687.
250. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 85 (1871). Although this is the page
cited in Monell, there is no express reference to takings of property by cities as such. In view,
however, of the then prevailing view that cities were but agencies of the states, see text ac-
companying notes 49-58 supra, the reference to uncompensated takings by states doubtless in-
cludes such takings by cities.
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As Monell held, these passages demonstrate Bingham's understanding that
the bill provided such a remedy; his argument would otherwise have been
irrelevant to the desirability of the bill. That understanding, though en-
compassing actions against cities, was primarily concerned with providing
remedies against the states themselves.
In addition, all members of Congress agreed that judicial remedies were
the preferable method of redressing a violation of the Constitution. Several
opponents of the Act urged that the federal courts were the sole appropriate
forum for redressing violations of the fourteenth amendment.251 Senator
Thurman insisted that the key to the American constitutional system was
that judicial redress was always available for a constitutional violation. Not-
ing the authorization of federal question jurisdiction in article III, Thurman
asserted:
there can be no question that can arise under the Constitution
that may not be made the subject of judicial decision.
That, then, is the great idea of the Constitution, that in respect
to this class of provisions, which are limitations upon the powers
of the States, they are to be protected through the Federal
judiciary.252
Representative Slater emphasized the broad remedial authority of the federal
courts to redress any violations of the fourteenth amendment.
The Federal courts, always open with writs of habeas corpus,
writs of restraint, and injunctions, and other remedial agencies,
can at all times render efficient and ample security against actual
or threatened disregard of these guarantees. Through the civil
agencies and remedies of the Federal courts is to be found the
means of enforcing the first section of the constitutional amend-
ment ... 253
Under sections 3 and 4 of the Act 25 4 the President was required to intervene
with the armed forces where other measures had failed and was authorized
where necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in order to prevent
continuation of the violent abuses of the Ku Klux Klan and similar organiza-
251. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 331 (1871) (remarks by Rep. Morgan) (the
remedy for an aggrieved citizen is "to go into the courts for redress against a violation of
these rights"), 420 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) (if there is a denial of equal protection "the
question is open to civil remedy, and the judicial power of this Government is the only power
to decide the question"), 578 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) ("in regard to all the rights secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment, however extended, in time of peace, the courts are established
to vindicate them, and they can be vindicated in no other way"), 645 (remarks of Sen. Davis)
("When the rights of men, either of person or property, are in issue, there is but one proper
course of legislation, and that is: for the legislative power to pass proper laws to regulate
them and to refer the enforcement and the execution of such laws to the courts . . .
252. Id. app., at 221.
253. Id. app., at 305. See also id. app., at 259 (remarks of Rep. Holman).
254. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3, 4, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
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tions. Any limitation on the remedial authority of the federal courts under
section 1 necessarily increased the likelihood that these more drastic measures
would be needed. Neither the supporters of the Act, who viewed military
force as a last resort,255 nor its opponents, who opposed such force under
any circumstances, 256 can readily be presumed to have intended to deny to
the federal courts the authority which might have enabled the courts to
remedy constitutional violations without resort to military action. Equally
importantly, the proponents of the bill intended that it extend as far as con-
gressional authority could reach.257  Senator Edmunds urged that, if the
evils in the South were as he believed, "every measure of constitutional
legislation which will have a tendency to preserve life and liberty and-uphold
order ought to be resorted to." 258 Senator Pool asserted:
The reconstruction policy, by which the political and civil
equality of all citizens is made a constitutional right, is meant to
be enforced as a measure of national safety. If there be not
sufficient constitutional power to enforce it effectually through the
courts, or should the courts be obstructed or in anywise fail in its
enforcement, the military power will have to be used .... 250
Since sections 3 and 4 of the bill did authorize the use of military force,
Pool must have understood sections 1 and 2 to authorize exercise of all the
"constitutional power" of the courts. Shortly after the bill became law,
Representative Perry commented that Congress had "asserted as fully as we
can assert the constitutional right of Congress to legislate." 260
The legislative history of section 1983 thus fully supports the broad
remedial authority of federal courts recognized by Quern and Milliken II.
255. "[Iln my judgment a resort to military power, that is, to martial law, should be
always avoided, if there be any other means to accomplish the result that the good and peace
of the nation may require to be accomplished." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
app., at 101 (remarks of Sen. Pool). "Obviously the court of justice is the first instrument
to be used in and of the fourteenth amendment; safer, milder, surer, more in accordance
with reason, with our system, and with public sentiment ... . How much better this than the
array of armed men, the suspension of civil process, the dread alternative of force." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Coburn). See also id. at 609
(remarks of Sen. Pool).
256. Id. at 330-31 (remarks of Rep. Morgan), 430 (remarks of Rep. McHenry).
257. The bill's supporters, in language that presaged Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976), argued that the fourteenth amendment enlarged the power of Congress so as to
overcome pre-existing limitations on its legislative authority. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 367 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Sheldon) (Civil War amendments "enlarge the
power of the Government in controlling the action of the States"; therefore, tenth amendment
restrictions irrelevant), 393 (remarks of Rep. Smith) (notwithstanding any previous limita-
tions in article III, "[t]he authority of Congress is enlarged by the Fourteenth Amendment"),
427 (remarks of Rep. McKee) (constitutional precedents relied on by opponents rendered
"obsolete because of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments").
258. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 691 (1871).
259. Id at 609.
260. Id. at 800. See also id. app., at 196 (remarks of Rep. Buckley) (he is "willing to go
to the very verge of constitutional limits to enable [the President] to protect constitutional
rights"), 312 (remarks of Rep. Burchard) ("I, for one, am willing to exercise the powers we
have for the protection of life and public order to the fullest extent. In a matter of doubt I
am ready to go to the extreme verge of fair construction that will justify Federal intervention.").
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3. The Limits of Injunctions under Section 1983. In Quern the
Court deemed this legislative history insufficient to conclude that Congress
intended to authorize the most drastic form of remedy, an action for dam-
ages against a state. But that remedy strikes at the very heart of the
eleventh amendment. It was such suits which were precluded by "the
States' traditional sovereign immunity," 261 and with which the eleventh
amendment was concerned.262 The situation presented by injunctive actions
against state officials who violate the federal constitution is very different.
There was no common-law immunity doctrine which section 1983 would
have needed to overturn, for the situation presented by the dual legal struc-
ture of our federal system did not exist in England. The problem had not
arisen when the eleventh amendment was adopted in 1798 because there
were then few constitutional limitations on the states, and there was no
federal question jurisdiction to enforce those that did exist. Thus the issue
presented by an .action seeking injunctive relief against a state official is
ordinarily sufficiently removed from the concerns underlying both sovereign
immunity and the eleventh amendment that the remedial authority of the
federal courts should properly be determined by reference to the purposes
of section 1983, without resort to any presumptions against "affirmative" or
other general categories of relief.
Analyzed in this manner the decisions in Quern and Milliken II uphold-
ing the compensatory injunctions there at issue make perfect sense. In both
cases the injunctions were framed to achieve the traditional purpose of a
remedial order-to restore the victim of the violation, insofar as possible,
to the position and conditions he or she would have enjoyed had the viola-
tion not occurred. In Milliken II the injury suffered was educational in
nature, and thus additional education was directed; in Quern the victims had
lost social security benefits, and the order was therefore aimed at producing
payment of those benefits. Restoration of the circumstances that would
have existed but for the violation is both a traditional and reasonably clear
standard for framing remedial decrees, and one with consequences fairly
forseeable by both courts and state officials. If, for example, state police
beat a plaintiff in violation of his constitutional rights, state officials, de-
pending on the nature of the resulting 'harm, might be directed to provide
medical services or physical rehabilitation at a state facility. If the victim
is so injured as to be unable to return to his or her previous employment,
state officials could be directed to offer job training or even employment.
In the case of a state employee who loses wages because of a constitutional
violation, for example, by being dismissed for protected free speech activities,
a court could order, in addition to reinstatement, that in the future the em-
ployee be granted an appropriate amount of compensatory time off with
261. Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1146-47 (1979).
262. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1974). The Supreme Court decision
which prompted the adoption of the amendment involved a damage action based on state
debts. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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pay, since such "comp time" is by now an established form of employee
compensation.
Quern, of course, forbids one form of injunctive relief, an order that
state officials pay damages with state funds, even though this too restores
the victim to the position he or she would have occupied absent the viola-
tion. But, as Edelman emphasized, such an order, though equitable in form,
is similar to the sort of damage awards that are the central concern of the
eleventh amendment. The restriction of Quern and Edelman would seem
to extend as well to an injunctive order that state officials provide services
to the victim which bear no reasonable relation to the particular injury
caused by the underlying violation. Thus while certain forms of relief noted
above might be appropriate in a police brutality case, a court could not direct
that the state road department pave the victim's driveway as compensation
for the pain and suffering inflicted. That sort of mandated state service
would have no connection to the underlying violation, other than as a
functional equivalent to a cash award, and thus falls within the prohibition
of Quern and Edelman. A federal court could, on the other hand, direct the
state to provide such services as could be said with reasonable certainty to
have been among the types of services the victim would have acquired and
enjoyed but for the violation. Thus while it would be a matter of speculation
whether the disabled victim of a beating by state officials might have paved
his or her driveway, there would be little doubt that if able to work he or she
would have used his or her wages to feed his or her family, and an order
requiring the state to provide the victim with food stamps would therefore be
appropriate.
The nature of the decree upheld in Quern makes plain the Supreme
Court's abandonment of Ex parte Young's restrictions on injunctive relief,
and deprives the distinction occasionally proferred between prospective and
retrospective relief of any useful meaning. Quern confirms the expansion
of the authority and responsibility of federal courts in actions against state
officials to afford compensatory injunctive relief which is fairly tailored to
redressing the underlying violation so long as it is not merely the functional
equivalent of a cash award. This remedial power strikes a reasonable and
intelligible balance between the remedial purposes of section 1983 and the
concerns underlying the eleventh amendment.
IV. PENDENT STATE CLAIMS
In the years between Monroe and Monell most cities and states had
or adopted laws consenting to suit in state court for some or all ordinary
torts by their employees.263  Since constitutional torts are in most cases
common-law torts, two attempts, both unsuccessful, were made to use these
263. See K DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §25.00 (Supp. 1970); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 25.00 to 25.00-2 (1976).
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state and local laws to obtain damages in federal court for constitutional viola-
tions. In Aldinger v. Howard,264 the Supreme Court considered and rejected
a suggestion that, in a section 1983 action against a county official, the
county itself might be joined as a "pendent party"; the Court reasoned that
Congress could not have intended that defendants which, according to
Monroe, Congress had expressly "excluded" from section 1983, could be
brought "back within" the power of the court "merely because the facts
also give rise to an ordinary civil action against them under state law." 2065
In Moor v. County of Alameda266 the Court concluded that the state law
liability of a county could not be incorporated into 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a
rule for fashioning remedies; the Court held that, since section 1988 pre-
cludes remedies "inconsistent with ... the laws of the United States," such a
remedial rule was unavailable under section 1988 because it would be in-
consistent with section 1983 as construed by Monroe.267
Clearly Monell destroys the basis of both Aldinger and Moor.2 08  The
issues raised by Aldinger and Moor remain important, however, since state
and city laws are often more liberal than Monell as to when damages can be
awarded; ordinarily neither the existence of an official policy nor the prob-
ability that the practice was unconstitutional are important under these laws.
In light of Monell, the first issue is not, as in Aldinger, whether a pen-
dent party can be added, but only whether a pendent state claim can be
asserted against the city or county which is already a party. This issue is
not controlled by the stringent standards announced in Aldinger, but by the
more liberal requirements of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs;269 it is sufficient
that there be a "common nucleus of operative fact" shared by the federal
claim and state claim and that the federal claim be substantial.2 70  The first
requirement will usually be met in any case where it is alleged that the con-
duct of certain officials was both a constitutional and a state law tort. The
merits of the constitutional claim will involve a contention not necessary for
the state law claim, that the tort violated the Constitution; whether that is
a substantial claim will of course depend on the circumstances of each case.
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction over a related state law claim will
generally be permissible except where the federal claim must be dismissed
prior to trial because the alleged conduct was not unconstitutional or be-
cause the conduct occurred at a time when it was clearly sanctioned by then
established constitutional principles. Redress of the constitutional claim in
a section 1983 case 271 requires proof as to two issues not relevant to the
264. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
265. Id. at 17 (emphasis deleted from original). See generally Comment, Aldinger v.
Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 CoLum. L. Rav. 127 (1977).
266. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
267. Id. at 706-10.
268. Monell intimates as much. 436 U.S. at 701 n.66.
269. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
270. Id. at 725.
271. The official policy or custom requirement, based as it is on the special legislativo
history of § 1983, would presumably not apply to an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question) or § 1332 (diversity).
[Vol. 79:213
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
state law claim-whether there was an official policy or custom, and whether
the city or state conduct involved an unreasonable danger of a constitutional
violation. The first element, once alleged, would usually require an eviden-
tiary hearing, and often will involve complex factual issues. Ordinarily,
however, it would be pointless for a court to conduct a trial on these issues,
since if the plaintiff can establish the other elements of his or her constitu-
tional claim, he or she will be entitled to judgment on the state claim
regardless of whether such an official policy or custom is involved and
regardless of the likelihood of constitutional injury.
Where state law sets a standard less stringent than in section 1983
for the imposition of liability, imposition of the lesser standard would
appear to be appropriate under Moor. Section 1988 provides that federal
courts may look to state law in fashioning remedies for constitutional
violations.272  Recent Supreme Court decisions construing section 1988
leave considerable uncertainty as to whether the courts are (a) to look
primarily to federal law, fashioning a federal rule if necessary, (b) to look
primarily to state law, (c) to use state law unless it is inadequate, in which
case federal law is to be used or fashioned, or (d) to choose whichever law
is suited to providing an effective remedy.273  But Moor itself approved two
lower court cases involving virtually the same issue as now will arise under
Monell.27 4  In both Hesselgesser v. Reilly 275 and Lewis v. Brautigam,'2 76 a
sheriff in a section 1983 action was held financially liable for constitutional
violations by his deputies "where state law provided for such vicarious
liability." 277 Section 1983, of course, does not itself impose such vicarious
liability on a sheriff, but Moor emphasized that in each case "the cause of
action was properly based on § 1983" 278 because a sheriff, unlike a county,
was an available section 1983 defendant. This seems indistinguishable
from using state respondeat superior rules to impose "vicarious" liability on
a county now that it, like a sheriff, is an available defendant. Monell'makes
it clear that for counties, as for sheriffs, the omission of "vicarious" liability
from section 1983 does not involve an affirmative congressional policy to
272. The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in
the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws
are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the 'court having jurisdiction of such
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts
in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
273. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247(1978); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
274. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. at 704 n.17.
275. 440 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1971).
276. 227 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1955).
277. 411 U.S. at 704 n.17.
278. Id.
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forbid any suits against cities and counties.270 Thus, if state or local law
imposes tort liability on a government body according to the principles of
respondeat superior, those principles should be applied under section 1988
in a section 1983 action.
CONCLUSION
Despite the fundamental change in section 1983 jurisprudence con-
templated by Monell, it is readily apparent that the issues which remain for
judicial resolution could readily be used to nullify Monell itself and to pre-
clude as a practical matter awards of monetary relief against government
bodies which violate the Constitution, just as Monroe mistakenly precluded
them as a matter of law. For example, a construction of section 1983 that
requires a showing of an intent to violate the Constitution, would be sufficient
by itself to preclude such awards in all but a handful of cases. Other inter-
pretations, such as severely limiting the class of officials who are deemed to
"make official policy," would allow cities to maintain unconstitutional prac-
tices with impunity through a simple manipulation of their internal procedures.
Such an emasculating result would frustrate not only the purpose of
Monell but the intent of the Forty-second Congress. The express achieve-
ment of section 1983, according to Representative Lowe, was that it "throws
open the doors of the United States courts to those whose rights under the
Constitution are denied or impaired." 280 That provision did not authorize
the courts to pick and choose from among constitutional violations those
which would be remedied, for Congress felt it was "the duty of the national
Government . . . to provide an ultimate remedy for the redress of every
wrong inflicted upon the citizen." 281 That any ambiguities in section 1983
were to be resolved in favor of assuring an adequate remedy was clearly
the intent of Representative Shellabarger, the chairman of the committee
that wrote the 1871 Civil Rights Act:
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty
and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions
authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficiently construed.
S. . [The largest latitude consistent with the words employed is
uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional pro-
visions as are meant to protect and defend and give remedies for
their wrongs to all the people.282
Monel and section 1983 should be applied and construed in that spirit in
the future.
279. Both Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190, and Moor, 411 U.S. at 709, stated that Congress
concluded that it lacked the constitutional power to authorize any suit against a city or county.
280. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 376 (1871). See also id. at 459 (remarks of
Rep. Coburn) ("Whenever, then, there is a denial of equal protection by the State, the courts
of justice of the nation stand with open doors .... ).
281. Id. at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon) (emphasis added). See also id. at 807
(remarks of Rep. Garfield) (§ 1983 "throws the protection of the courts of the United States
over the right of every citizen to enjoy all the privileges and immunities secured to him by
the Constitution," and authorizes a suit for redress "if any of these rights are denied")
(emphasis added).
282. Id. app., at 68.
